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ABSTRACT
In Ohio v. American Express, both the majority and dissent
introduced into Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence a new test for
evaluating restraints under the rule of reason: a less restrictive alternatives
test. Occasionally appearing in circuit court cases, less restrictive
alternatives tests have not been part of Supreme Court’s approach to the
rule of reason, which generally evaluates restraints of trade by balancing
their anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.
American Express was the first Supreme Court case to mention a less
restrictive alternatives test, potentially representing a major shift in
antitrust law, but it was not the last. In 2021’s Alston v. NCAA, the
Supreme Court applied the test to strike several NCAA compensation
restrictions, but it did so without explaining how the test might fit into the
rule of reason or providing any single statement of the rule of reason.
Rather than explicitly adopting the less restrictive alternatives test as a
necessary part of the rule of reason, the Court merely noted that it has
“sometimes spoken of” a three-step framework that includes the less
restrictive alternatives test, suggesting that the test might or might not
apply in any particular rule of reason case.
The Supreme Court has discussed alternatives in antitrust cases,
though, and many find in those cases a distinct less restrictive alternatives
test. Careful analysis of the cases shows that prior to Alston, the Court has
not used anything like a less restrictive alternatives test. Nor should it. A
less restrictive alternatives test injects tremendous uncertainty into the rule
of reason while doing little to reduce the problems inherent in the kind of
balancing the rule of reason requires. The Court’s willingness to accept
the less restrictive alternatives test in Alston without accounting for the
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ramifications of the test is likely to increase confusion in antitrust cases as
litigants struggle not only with the inherent indeterminacy of the less
restrictive alternatives test itself but also with the question of whether the
less restrictive alternatives test is even relevant to their particular case.
This Article traces the development of the less restrictive alternatives
test in antitrust scholarship and commentary and evaluates how
consideration of alternatives actually does, and should, inform antitrust
analysis. The scholarly impulse to include a less restrictive alternatives test
in the rule of reason actually highlights the need for a reinvigorated
approach to another aspect of antitrust law: the ancillary restraints
doctrine. Properly applied, the ancillary restraints doctrine responds to the
concerns that motivate the less restrictive alternatives test, but less
restrictive alternatives are of limited use even in that inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION
Ohio v. American Express Co.1 can only be described as a highly
contentious antitrust case. With Justice Thomas writing the majority and
Justice Breyer writing for the dissent, the Court split 5–4 on the question
of how antitrust should treat “two-sided markets”2: a question of
considerable importance as large tech platforms are receiving increasing
attention in antitrust.3 Given the level of disagreement in the case, it is
worth identifying one point of agreement between the majority and
1. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
2. Compare id. at 2287 (“[W]e will analyze the two-sided market for credit-card transactions as
a whole to determine whether the plaintiffs have shown that Amex’s antisteering provisions have
anticompetitive effects.”), with id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s discussion of
market definition is [] wrong.”).
3. Both Google and Facebook have recently been sued by antitrust enforcers. See Complaint,
United States v. Google, No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020); Complaint, FTC v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 1:20-cv-3590 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020); Complaint, New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv03589 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020). The FTC has initiated investigations against Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Microsoft. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large
Technology Companies (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftcexamine-past-acquisitions-large-technology-companies [https://perma.cc/8KGK-ZCTP]. In addition
to congressional hearings, numerous pieces of legislation have been introduced to cabin the power of
large online platforms. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Senator Klobuchar Introduces
Sweeping Bill to Promote Competition and Improve Antitrust Enforcement (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/senator-klobuchar-introduces-sweepingbill-to-promote-competition-and-improve-antitrust-enforcement [https://perma.cc/9ZPN-P7WH]).
On the antitrust review of platforms, see Thomas B. Nachbar, Platform Effects, 62 JURIMETRICS J. 1
(2021).
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dissent: under the rule of reason’s burden-shifting framework,4 after a
plaintiff demonstrates an anticompetitive effect and a defendant responds
with a procompetitive justification, the plaintiff may then show that the
defendant could have achieved their objective through a less restrictive
alternative.5 With such strong disagreement in that case, it is almost
refreshing to find a point on which all sides can agree.
What makes Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer’s unanimous
agreement on a less restrictive alternatives test all the more noteworthy is
that it was the first time such a test has been suggested, much less explicitly
articulated, by the Supreme Court.6
For Justice Breyer, in particular, the move to include a less restrictive
alternatives test within the rule of reason was a surprising one. Antitrust’s
“rule of reason,” which is applied in the vast majority of antitrust cases, is
generally attributed to Justice Brandeis in 1918’s Chicago Board of Trade
v. United States7 and asks whether a restraint, on balance, enhances or
reduces competition. Over eighty years later, in California Dental Ass’n
v. FTC,8 Justice Breyer himself provided what the Court has come to
accept9 as the canonical modern statement of the rule of reason: “(1) What
is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive
effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the
parties have sufficient market power to make a difference?”10 Justice
Breyer’s authoritative statement in CDA conspicuously lacks any mention
of less restrictive alternatives.11
The majority and dissent’s mention of less restrictive alternatives in
American Express were even more remarkable because the question of less
4. There are two primary forms of analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Some restraints
(such as price fixing) are “per se” illegal, but most are decided under the “rule of reason,” which
balances the anticompetitive effects of a restraint with its procompetitive justifications. See Am.
Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2283–84; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 122,
132 (2018).
5. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284; id. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive Alternatives Doctrine: A Case Study in
Its Application in the Sports Context, 9 SPORTS L.J. 227, 227 (2002) (“[T]he United States Supreme
Court has never officially recognized the less restrictive alternatives doctrine[.]”); C. Scott Hemphill,
Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 940 (2016) (“The Supreme
Court has given no sustained attention to the LRA test, despite its extensive use by lower courts. Most
strikingly, the Court has never endorsed (or rejected) the test.”).
7. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States (Chicago Bd. of Trade), 246 U.S. 231 (1918). On
balancing, see generally Hemphill, supra note 6, at 934–35; Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 131–33.
8. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
9. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 156 (2013) (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n,
526 U.S. at 786–87 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
10. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On
the place of Justice Breyer’s formulation of the rule of reason, see Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 124.
11. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 342 n.374 (5th ed. 2016) [hereinafter
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY].
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restrictive alternatives was irrelevant to either opinion’s approach to the
case. The entire disagreement between the majority and dissent was over
the application of the first step12 of the rule of reason analysis: whether the
plaintiff had shown an anticompetitive effect.13 Because the Court agreed
that the question of less restrictive alternatives happens in the third step in
the analysis, a step which neither the majority nor dissent thought was
necessary to reach, the case’s embrace of the less restrictive alternatives
test was pure dicta.14 Nevertheless, American Express became Supreme
Court authority for the less restrictive alternatives test.
It did not take long for that authority to get used. In 2021’s NCAA v.
Alston,15 the Court recognized its identification of the less restrictive
alternatives test in American Express without explicitly adopting the less
restrictive alternatives test as part of the rule or reason. Citing the
American Express dicta, the Court only noted that it has “sometimes
spoken of” a three-part test that includes the less restrictive alternatives
test.16 The Court affirmed the lower court’s use of less restrictive
alternatives in its analysis,17 but the Court in Alston did not expressly make
the less restrictive alternatives test part of the rule of reason nor, indeed,
provide any single articulation of the rule of reason in that case.18
As shown below, the Court’s treatment of less restrictive alternatives
in American Express and Alston was actually fairly typical of how the
issue has been treated in the courts: confusion over the relevance of less
restrictive alternatives accompanied by an almost complete failure to apply
the less restrictive alternatives test in any kind of rigorous or systematic
way.19 Although never previously applied by the Supreme Court, less
restrictive alternatives tests are occasionally used by lower courts. In a
high-profile example, the Ninth Circuit debated the role of less restrictive

12. The Court’s use of the three-step approach seems to simply be following the Second Circuit’s
approach in the case. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 883 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Second
Circuit cases for the three-step framework). The Supreme Court has not itself used the three-step
framework in a case other than American Express itself.
13. Compare Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018), with id. at 2295–96
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 2284; id. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
16. Id. at 2160.
17. Id. at 2162–63.
18. Indeed, the Court injected considerable doubt into the content of the rule of reason,
suggesting it is a wide-ranging inquiry into the circumstances of every case with very few constraints
or limiting features. See id. at 2160.
19. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 1265, 1337–38 (finding in his survey of rule of reason cases only seven cases that had applied
the less restrictive alternatives test and only three that had applied it correctly).
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alternatives in O’Bannon v. NCAA20 and applied it in the follow-on NCAA
compensation case that led to Alston.21 The Ninth Circuit in both cases
inserted less restrictive alternatives as a formal step in rule of reason
analysis and made the less restrictive alternatives determination
categorical: if a plaintiff can show that there is a less restrictive alternative,
the defendant loses. Among courts more broadly, the use of less restrictive
alternatives is uneven, both among and within circuits.22 Less restrictive
alternatives have found far more acceptance among commentators.23
This article takes a more critical approach to less restrictive
alternatives, examining their use in antitrust. Although generally advanced
by commentators as part of the rule of reason, review of the cases shows
that the Supreme Court has not considered less restrictive alternatives in
rule of reason cases and, even after Alston, does not give them the kind of
determinative, categorical status that the Ninth Circuit gave them in
O’Bannon and Alston. Rather, the less restrictive alternatives analysis
more closely fits the inquiry undertaken by the ancillary restraints
doctrine, which asks whether a restraint is “reasonably necessary” to
further some legitimate productive activity.24 Both the recent scholarly
emphasis on less restrictive alternatives and acceptance of the less
restrictive alternatives test by the Court in Alston highlights the importance
of the ancillary restraints doctrine, an aspect of antitrust analysis that
receives comparably little scholarly attention.
The invocation of less restrictive alternatives in rule of reason cases
seeks to frame the central question in ancillary restraints analysis
(necessity) in the cost–benefit terms of the Court’s modern rule of reason
analysis. Doing so, however, undermines the limited nature of the ancillary
restraints doctrine, resulting in the collapse of the ancillary restraints
doctrine into the kind of indiscriminate rule of reason balancing that many
proponents of the less restrictive alternatives test seek to avoid.

20. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074–79 (9th Cir. 2015); id. at 1081–83 (Thomas, C.J.,
dissenting).
21. NCAA v. Alston, Nos. 20-512, 20-520, 2020 WL 7366281 (U.S. Dec., 16, 2020).
22. Gabriel A. Feldman, Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason
Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 583 (2009); Grewe, supra note 6, at 231; Hemphill, supra note 6, at
941–42.
23. See, e.g., 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505 (1985) [hereinafter ANTITRUST
LAW (1st ed.)]; LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, WARREN S. GRIMES & CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 224–25 (2016); Alan Devlin, Antitrust as Regulation,
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 824 (2012); Hemphill, supra note 6, at 940–41; Hovenkamp, supra note
4, at 104, 114; Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 77, 110 (2003); see also Feldman, supra note 22, at 581–82 n.101.
24. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

2022]

Less Restrictive Alternatives and Ancillary Restraints

593

Less restrictive alternatives tests are problematic on their own terms.
They are almost impossible to constrain—to prevent a “less restrictive
alternatives” test from devolving into a “least restrictive alternatives” test.
Their boundlessness is demonstrated not only by how vigorously their
limits are debated among academics and courts but also by the inability of
their proponents to describe what those limits are or even how they could
be measured. Less restrictive alternatives tests are likely to have outsized
effects in technologically dynamic industries, especially those involving
information technology and two-sided platforms, adding additional
uncertainty to how antitrust will be applied to those industries. If the Court
were to accept the less restrictive alternatives test as a formal step in the
rule of reason, it would work a fundamental change to antitrust law.
Consideration of alternatives more generally is a valuable analytical
tool, though, and is frequently used by courts in deciding antitrust cases,
just not in the way proponents of less restrictive alternatives tests would
have them. The impulse to look for less restrictive alternatives highlights
previously ignored aspects of ancillary restraints analysis and offers an
opportunity to reconstruct the ancillary restraints doctrine to make it a
more effective tool for analyzing restraints of all kinds.
This article proceeds in four Parts. Part I is a comprehensive review
of the authority that has been offered for the less restrictive alternatives
test. While the less restrictive alternatives test has (prior to American
Express and Alston) either gone unmentioned or been affirmatively
rejected in Supreme Court cases, commentators have found several
instances in which the Court has mentioned alternatives, and in those
cases, commentators see a less restrictive alternatives test. Examination of
those cases, though, shows that even when the Court has considered
alternatives, it has not used a less restrictive alternatives test; indeed, the
Court has frequently considered more restrictive alternatives. With no
solid precedent for less restrictive alternatives, Part II considers whether a
less restrictive alternatives test nevertheless belongs in the rule of reason
and highlights the practical problems of applying such a test. The
incremental nature of the less restrictive alternatives inquiry makes it
almost impossible to limit, driving courts to look for ever-less restrictive
alternatives. That presents a particular danger to markets for intangible
products, such as Internet platforms, since the boundaries of those
products are difficult to define. Next, Part III describes how the Court
actually has used alternatives, which is within the ancillary restraints
doctrine. The ancillary restraints doctrine precedes application of the rule
of reason and requires not a comparative “less restrictive” analysis but
rather a binary determination of whether a restraint is related to a
procompetitive justification. Finally, Part IV flips the inquiry and explores
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how considering alternatives highlights important yet frequently
overlooked aspects of the ancillary restraints doctrine.
I. THE DOCTRINE AND COMMENTARY ON LESS
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES
Perhaps the best that can be said about authority for the less
restrictive alternatives test in the courts is that it is confused. The Court’s
discussions of the test in both Ohio v. American Express and NCAA v.
Alston are instructive.
A. Less Restrictive Alternatives in American Express
When Justice Thomas declared “the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be
reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means,” he cited two
sources: Julian von Kalinowski’s antitrust loose-leaf, Antitrust Laws and
Trade Regulation, and a Second Circuit case, Capital Imaging Associates,
P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc.25 When Justice Breyer
agreed that “the antitrust plaintiff may still carry the day by showing that
it is possible to meet the legitimate objective in less restrictive ways,” he
cited only one source: Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp’s multivolume Antitrust Law treatise.26 That was the sum total of the Court’s
authority. Neither opinion cited any Supreme Court case on less restrictive
alternatives, leaving the question ostensibly to the Second Circuit and two
secondary sources.
The treatment in the Second Circuit was not much better. Perhaps
because, as in the Supreme Court, the less restrictive alternatives question
was not relevant to the Second Circuit’s resolution of the case.27 The court
nevertheless described the less restrictive alternatives test, citing Geneva
Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,28 which
was Second Circuit precedent. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, in turn, had
relied on another Second Circuit case, Capital Imaging Associates, P.C. v.

25. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (first citing 1 JULIAN VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 12.02[1] (2d ed. 2007); and then citing
Cap. Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)).
26. See id. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507a at 442 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 7 ANTITRUST LAW (4th
ed.)]).
27. The plaintiff failed to establish anticompetitive effects or market power, so the court did not
reach the less restrictive alternatives question. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d. 179,
202 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
28. Am. Express, 838 F.3d. at 193 (citing Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab’ys Inc., 386
F.3d 485, 506 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc.29 for the less restrictive
alternatives test.30 If Capital Imaging sounds familiar, that is because it is
the same Second Circuit case Justice Thomas cited for the less restrictive
alternatives test in American Express.31
Justice Breyer did not cite any case for the less restrictive alternatives
test, relying exclusively on the fourth edition of Antitrust Law.32 Antitrust
Law, though, also cites Capital Imaging,33 making that case central to the
appearance of the less restrictive alternatives test in the Supreme Court
American Express case.34
Like the Supreme Court and Second Circuit American Express cases,
Capital Imaging articulated the less restrictive alternatives test in dicta;
the case was decided on the plaintiff’s failure to show either an
anticompetitive effect or that the defendant had market power.35 Thus, at
least as far as the Supreme Court goes, the adoption of the less restrictive
alternatives test in American Express appears to be the adoption, without
any analysis or even acknowledgment, of Second Circuit precedent
(announced as dicta) on the less restrictive alternatives test, taking sides
among divided circuits over the application of the test without the issue
even being raised.36 Many lower courts do apply a less restrictive
alternatives test,37 but the test is subject to general confusion over exactly
what the origin or justification for the less restrictive alternatives test is or
what it requires.38 It is hard to imagine that either Justice Thomas or Justice
Breyer intended to displace the Court’s prior approach to the rule of
reason, but that became a possibility after American Express.

29. Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp., 386 F.3d at 507 (citing Cap. Imaging Assocs., 996
F.2d at 543).
30. See Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 195.
31. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
32. Id. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1913, at 396, n. 2 (4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter
11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.)] (citing Cap. Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 543). The primary treatment
of the less restrictive alternatives test is in paragraph 1913a, which has cited Capital Imaging
Associates since that paragraph was added to the treatise in 1998. See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1913a at 304, n. 2 (1998) [hereinafter 11 ANTITRUST LAW (1st ed.)].
34. Antitrust Law does cite other cases in addition to Capital Imaging Associates. See 11
ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913.
35. Cap. Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 546.
36. The parties appear to have been operating under the reasonable assumption that Second
Circuit precedent would apply, and the Supreme Court seems to have taken the issue as the parties
framed it. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2277; id. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37. See 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913; Devlin, supra note 23, at 824
(collecting cases in the various circuits); Grewe, supra note 6, at 236–45 (same); Hemphill, supra note
6, at 941 (same).
38. Devlin, supra note 23, at 838; Feldman, supra note 22, at 583; Grewe, supra note 6, at 231;
Hemphill, supra note 6, at 941–42.
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B. Less Restrictive Alternatives in NCAA v. Alston
That possibility was realized in NCAA v. Alston. In that case, the
lower courts had, unlike in American Express, actually applied the less
restrictive alternatives test in a way that controlled the outcome of the
case,39 so at least the issue was actually live. As in American Express,
though, the litigants had largely accepted Ninth Circuit precedent on the
less restrictive alternatives test, with the NCAA arguing not that the less
restrictive alternatives test itself was bad law but rather that the lower court
had misapplied the test as a “least restrictive alternatives” test.40 As a
result, the less restrictive alternatives question in Alston was argued by the
parties on its margins (how much less restrictive?) but not on the question
of whether the test was part of the rule of reason in the first place.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ application of less
restrictive alternatives,41 but the Court’s treatment of precedent for the test
was even more cryptic than in American Express. The Court did not
describe the test as a necessary part of the rule of reason (or even provide
a statement of the rule of reason at all) but merely said that it had
“sometimes spoken of” a three-step test that included less restrictive
alternatives, citing only the dicta in American Express.42
It is difficult to imagine a more tepid embrace of the less restrictive
alternatives test than that offered by the Court in Alston. The phrasing
“sometimes spoken of” is more reminiscent of some pleasant memory of
a long-passed event than the establishment of binding precedent by the
highest court in the land. Moreover, the failure of the Court or provide any
definitive statement that the rule of reason requires lower courts to
consider less restrictive alternatives, or even of the rule of reason itself, is
likely to result in confusion among lower courts, as they decide whether
they must, should, or may, include a test that the Supreme Court has
“sometimes spoken of.” The Court notably failed to situate the less
restrictive alternatives test within previous rule of reason precedent, such
as Chicago Board of Trade, or the modern cases applying its balancing
framework.43 Wholly aside from the less restrictive alternatives test
question, Alston’s articulation introduces uncertainty as to whether there
is a single rule of reason or many, or how lower courts should decide which
version to adopt in a particular case. Even for those like me who doubt the
39. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1088 (N.D.
Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141
(2021).
40. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2162.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2160.
43. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States (Chicago Bd. of Trade), 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). On
the modern treatment of Chicago Board of Trade, see supra text accompanying notes 7–10.
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value of the less restrictive alternatives test, Alston would have been better
if it had adopted a clear articulation of the rule of reason. Even on its own
terms, Alston is a jurisprudential flub.44 The case is only the weakest form
of precedent for any rule of antitrust law, much less the less restrictive
alternatives test itself.
C. The Scholarship and Commentary on Less Restrictive Alternatives
Given the lack of treatment (or even acknowledgment45 before
American Express) in the Supreme Court and confusion in the lower
courts, the most likely place to look for guidance on less restrictive
alternatives tests is in scholarship and commentary. Proponents of the less
restrictive alternatives test suggest its use in a variety of circumstances
within the rule of reason and in some cases, beyond. Professor Herbert
Hovenkamp offers the less restrictive alternatives test as a distinct, third
step in a four-step rule of reason inquiry roughly mirroring the three-step
test applied in American Express and Alston.46
Even without conducting the rule of reason in stepwise fashion,
though, one could use a less restrictive alternatives test for other purposes.
Professor Scott Hemphill suggests three functions for a less restrictive
alternatives test, a “shortcut, a locus of balancing, and a tool of smoking
out.”47 It is a shortcut to balancing by allowing courts to compare
alternative restraints rather than having to compare procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects of a restraint,48 an innovation by courts to avoid the

44. It is tempting to attribute the Court’s equivocal language combined with its failure to
articulate a clear statement of the rule of reason to the Court’s own doubts about the viability of the
less restrictive alternatives test, especially given the Court’s concerns about the harmfulness of the
NCAA’s restraints in this particular case. The case has garnered substantial media attention for the
NCAA’s potential to exploit unpaid players, and the oral argument focused heavily on the NCAA’s
market power and the practical effects of the restraints, with little attention to the Ninth Circuit’s
approach to the law. Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately to highlight the NCAA’s highly
anticompetitive nature, again with no attention to less restrictive alternatives. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at
2166–67 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Alston and the Court’s willingness to apply, if not embrace, the
less restrictive alternatives test may very well be part of an antitrust tradition of great cases making
bad law. See N. Sec. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Great cases
like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance
in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest
which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.”).
45. Grewe, supra note 6, at 227 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has never officially
recognized the less restrictive alternatives doctrine[.]”); Hemphill, supra note 6, at 940 (“The Supreme
Court has given no sustained attention to the LRA test, despite its extensive use by lower courts. Most
strikingly, the Court has never endorsed (or rejected) the test.”).
46. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 102–04; see also 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33,
¶ 1913a, at 395-96.
47. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 947.
48. Id. at 952.
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“anxiety”49 they feel over doing open-ended rule of reasoning balancing.
By being equally effective while being less restrictive, less restrictive
alternatives that are clearly better (or “dominant”) can serve as a locus of
balancing between the effectiveness and cost of alternative restraints.50
Finally, a less restrictive alternatives test can be used to “smoke out”
anticompetitive intent, which Professor Hemphill acknowledges has
limited value in antitrust law.51 These three functions can be divided into
two distinct categories: the first two functions place less restrictive
alternatives within rule of reason balancing, and the third goes to intent,
which is distinct from balancing itself. Professor Hemphill finds that the
less restrictive alternatives “test appears in a wide range of antitrust
cases.”52
Others have suggested other roles for less restrictive alternatives.
Professor Lawrence Sullivan suggested the use of less restrictive
alternatives as a prerequisite to performing a full market analysis under the
rule of reason to the point that he, like Professor Hovenkamp, would not
perform full rule of reason balancing without first evaluating the
availability of less restrictive alternatives, although he did not argue it
should be a separate step in the analysis.53 Professor Areeda, prior to
Hovenkamp’s addition to the Antitrust Law treatise, suggested that less
restrictive alternatives could be used to determine either the defendant’s
objective or the necessity of the restraint.54 Like Areeda, others have
identified the value of imposing a less restrictive alternatives requirement
generally on the rule of reason analysis.55
But not everyone is a fan of less restrictive alternatives. Most
criticisms center on the impracticality of evaluating restraints. Professor
Alan Meese puts it succinctly: “[M]any of the less restrictive alternatives
posited by courts and scholars are either less effective, more expensive to
administer, or both.”56 Some just believe that the less restrictive
alternatives test is not or should not be present in the case law.57
49. Id. at 949 (“The resulting anxiety about balancing has led courts and commentators to shy
away from an analysis of net effects.”).
50. Id. at 959.
51. Id. at 968.
52. Id. at 938.
53. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 835, 851 (1987).
54. 7 ANTITRUST LAW (1st ed.), supra note 23, ¶ 1505 at 383.
55. E.g., Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
893, 909 (1987) (“On balance, therefore, evaluation of alternatives within the limits suggested above
should be a part of antitrust’s methodology in cases involving integration.”)
56. Meese, supra note 23, at 168; see also Devlin, supra note 23, at 826; Feldman, supra note
22, at 563.
57. See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman
Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 266, 334 (1986) [hereinafter Arthur, Sea of Doubt].
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What is clear from a review of the scholarship is that scholars have
devoted considerably more attention to the question of less restrictive
alternatives test than have the courts and in doing so have provided a
compelling argument for at least some consideration of less restrictive
alternatives. The question is how less restrictive alternatives should factor
in antitrust cases. It is possible the Court in American Express was simply
acknowledging explicitly what has been implicit in the rule of reason, a
possibility considered by the next Section.
D. The Supreme Court and the Absence of a Less
Restrictive Alternatives Test
Scholars and commentators have pointed to a number of Supreme
Court cases in support of a less restrictive alternatives test. This Section
considers the asserted Supreme Court sources for a less restrictive
alternatives test and demonstrates that none of the proffered precedents
actually stands for the use of less restrictive alternatives in the rule of
reason. Instead, the cases show that the Court uses alternatives in a much
less systematic way than advocated by proponents of a less restrictive
alternatives test.
1. Addyston Pipe
Although not a Supreme Court opinion, later-Chief Justice Taft’s
opinion in the Sixth Circuit case United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co.58 has been hugely influential. Judge Robert Bork described it as “one
of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in the history of the
law,”59 and it is generally acknowledged to be the source of the ancillary
restraints doctrine—the requirement that restraints “ancillary” to a larger,
productive transaction60 be evaluated differently than “naked” restraints,
whose sole purpose is to limit competition61—in American antitrust law.62
The doctrine has been particularly relevant to arguments in favor of a less
restrictive alternatives test as part of the rule of reason.
58. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
59. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 26 (1978).
60. Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 353 (2000) (describing the connection the ancillary restraints
doctrine draws between restraints and productive efficiency) [hereinafter Arthur, Workable Rule of
Reason].
61. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J.).
62. Id. at 188–89 (reciting the ancillary restraints doctrine and citing Addyston Pipe); BORK,
supra note 59, at 27 (same); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 139–40 (same); Hemphill, supra note 6, at
938 (same).
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Addyston Pipe dealt with a price fixing conspiracy among a group of
six pipe manufacturers. The defendants “admitted the existence of an
association between them” to avoid great losses63 but argued that their low
collective market share (below 30%) combined with their price structure
(tied to market rates) made it impossible for them to have restrained trade,
as “the public had all the benefit from competition which public policy
demanded.”64 They also argued that the prices they fixed were
“reasonable” ones and therefore “did not exceed in degree of stringency
or scope what was necessary to protect the parties.”65
Judge Taft rejected all these claims. Although he found a “relaxing
of the original strictness of the common law”66 regarding contracts in
restraint of trade, such “relaxing” was only in cases involving “contracts
in which the covenant in restraint of trade was ancillary to the main and
lawful purpose of the contract,” not those “having for their sole object the
restraint of trade.”67 The defendants’ purpose was to limit competition
itself, which meant their restraints were not subject to this more tolerant
rule. In describing the difference between what has come to be called a
“naked”68 restraint (such as the defendants’) and one “merely ancillary to
the main purpose of a lawful contract,”69 Judge Taft gave birth to the
ancillary restraints doctrine, which provides a rule for distinguishing
between the two principal categories of cases under Section 1: restraints
that are per se unlawful and ones that require deeper inquiry under the rule
of reason.70
As described by both Lawrence Sullivan and Thomas Arthur,
Addyston Pipe reconciled a tension between a near-literal view of the
Sherman Act as applying to “every . . . restraint of trade” and the
unbounded balancing of procompetitive effects and anticompetitive
effects in Chicago Board of Trade.71 Addyston Pipe opened up the
possibility of conducting an inquiry in every case as to the legitimacy of a
restraint without engaging in a wide-ranging cost–benefit analysis.72 It did
63. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 272–74.
64. Id. at 279.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 283.
67. Id.
68. The word “naked” does not appear in Addyston Pipe. The concept of a “naked restraint” first
appeared (in the Supreme Court) in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963),
without citation to Addyston Pipe.
69. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
71. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1; see also Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 57,
at 374; Sullivan, supra note 53, at 838; Clarence E. Eldridge, A New Interpretation of the Sherman
Act, 13 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1914) (explaining Addyston Pipe’s role in the reconciling the differences
among two sets of cases).
72. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 132–33.
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so by limiting the inquiry to the specific restraint and its effect on the larger
transaction.73 Sullivan went on to find that not only should the relationship
exist, but it must also include—”most importantly”—consideration of less
restrictive alternatives.74 Sullivan connected his conclusion about less
restrictive alternatives to what he called the “proportionality” between the
restraint and the productive purpose of the larger transaction.75 A less
restrictive alternatives test ensures that a restraint out of proportion with
the gains from the larger transaction could not be justified.
Another way to think about the problem is from the perspective of
necessity, which featured even more prominently in Addyston Pipe. Judge
Taft’s understanding required not only that the restraint was ancillary in
that it was subordinate76 to the primary purpose of the contract, but it was
also “necessary” to that purpose.77 By limiting the available justifications
to those that are the least restrictive available, one can avoid permitting
restraints that do not actually serve the productive purpose of the larger
transaction. Professor Scott Hemphill finds support in Addyston Pipe for a
less restrictive alternatives test from Judge Taft’s dual requirement of
ancillarity78 and necessity.79 Taft also relied on reasonableness to sort
among valid and invalid restraints, but “reasonable” itself was a
determination to be made based on the relationship between the restraint
and the purpose of the larger transaction: “Whatever restraint is larger than
the necessary protection of the party requires can be of no benefit to either.
It can only be oppressive. It is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable.”80
Not everyone sees a less restrictive alternatives test in Addyston Pipe
though. Professor Thomas Arthur argues that Judge Taft’s emphasis on the
purpose of the larger transaction did not suggest an inquiry into less
73. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 838.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 854; see also Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (“The main purpose of the contract suggests
the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity
of such restraints may be judicially determined.”).
76. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 51 (1880) (defining
“ancillary” as “[s]ubservient or subordinate, like a handmaid”); BORK, supra note 59, at 27 (defining
“ancillary” as “subordinate and collateral”).
77. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (“[I]t would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid down
for determining the validity of such an agreement that no conventional restraint of trade can be
enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract,
and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract . . . .” (emphasis added)).
78. I’m ashamed to admit that “ancillarity” is a word used in antitrust circles and one I myself
use, occasionally without irony.
79. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 938–39 (arguing that Addyston Pipe means that “horizontal
restraints must be both ‘ancillary’ to a desirable purpose and no more restrictive than necessary to
achieve the purpose”).
80. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (quoting Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Co., [1894] App.
Cas. 535, 567); see Kauper, supra note 55, at 908–09 n.73.
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restrictive alternatives; rather, Judge Taft’s concern, as informed by the
common law background on restraints of trade,81 was over purpose—or
even intent—more generally,82 and not whether the restraint was tailored
in any particular way to that purpose. As a result, under his reading of
Addyston Pipe, almost any connection will do, not just a least restrictive
one.83 This reading of Addyston Pipe resembles the interpretation of Judge
Bork, perhaps Addyston Pipe’s greatest modern booster, who emphasized
the need for an ancillary restraint to contribute to the larger transaction,
but not to any particular degree.84 It is also possible for one to take a middle
road interpretation: Professor Thomas Kauper sees the “necessity” in
Addyston Pipe as indeterminate, potentially, but not necessarily,
supporting the evaluation of less restrictive alternatives.85
While one can argue over the relationship between concepts like
necessity or reasonableness and less restrictive alternatives without end,
the real question for modern arguments for less restrictive alternatives is
not whether Addyston Pipe got the law of restraints correct; rather, it is
whether a case dealing with price fixing has much to say about the use of
less restrictive alternatives in other contexts. In addition, virtually all of
Judge Taft’s exegesis on the common law of trade restraints was dicta. The
defendants in Addyston Pipe were not arguing around the margins of the
ancillary restraints doctrine; the object of their conspiracy was to control
the price of pipe directly—it had no other purpose. Although encyclopedic
in its collection of both contracts and antitrust cases, Addyston Pipe offers
little guidance on how any of the dozens of cases it cites would apply to a
restraint that actually was ancillary to some other productive activity, as
the defendants’ was not.86
2. Mining the Cases for a Test
In the end, Judge Taft is a poor source for the less restrictive
alternatives test and the law in the circuits is confused. But various
commentators perceive support in a variety of places in the U.S. Reports.
81. Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 57, at 281; id. at 296–97.
82. Id. at 297 (“The requirement that nonnaked restraints be ‘reasonably ancillary, to a valid
business purpose provided a tool to ferret out cartel restraints disguised as ancillary to legitimate
ventures.”).
83. Id. at 334; see also Arthur, Workable Rule of Reason, supra note 60, at 380 (modifying his
reading of Addyston Pipe to a two-step inquiry that includes some consideration of less restrictive
alternatives).
84. BORK, supra note 59, at 27 (describing an ancillary restraint as one that “makes the main
transaction more effective in accomplishing legitimate business purposes”).
85. Kauper, supra note 55, at 908–09 n.73.
86. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 283; cf. Arthur, Workable Rule of Reason, supra note 60, at 342
(describing the “non-exhaustive list of five transactions to which a restraint could be ancillary”)
(footnotes omitted).
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Justice Brennan, for example, endorsed consideration of less restrictive
alternatives as “[a]nother pertinent inquiry” in his concurrence in White
Motor Co. v. United States,87 but the Court never took up his invitation,
and Justice Rehnquist wrote even more forcefully against them.88 Other
than occasional dissents and concurrences, the Supreme Court had not,
prior to American Express, discussed, much less applied, the less
restrictive alternatives test. The cases typically cited for relying on less
restrictive alternatives analysis do not engage in any real comparison of
alternatives, which is the essence of considering less restrictive
alternatives, thus making them poor precedents for a less restrictive
alternatives test. Deeper examination of some of the cases shows they
actually reflect the rejection of the less restrictive alternatives test rather
than its acceptance.
a. NCAA
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,89 the Court
considered limitations on the number of football games that member
schools could televise.90 The NCAA argued that the restrictions made the
product “high-quality college football” more attractive to fans.91 The Court
rejected that argument finding the plan reduced rather than increased the
number of televised football games, undermining the NCAA’s
justification.92
While deciding the case, the Court considered the efficacy of the
specific restraints, and in that consideration, the Ninth Circuit,93 along with
several commentators, saw a less restrictive alternatives test. According to
Professor Hemphill, “[t]he Supreme Court rejected [the NCAA’s]
argument because competitive balance was already promoted equally well
by other existing NCAA rules that had no restrictive effect.”94 Professor
Kauper, too, thought the Court “clearly rested its decision in part on the
finding that any efficiencies created by the defendant’s restraint need not
be weighed because they could have been achieved in less restrictive
87. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Regarding the particular restraints at issue in White Motor—vertical exclusive territories—the Court
affirmatively disclaimed consideration of a less restrictive alternative in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.29 (1977) (“The location restriction used by Sylvania was neither the
least nor the most restrictive provision that it could have used.”).
88. Nat’l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.).
89. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
90. Id. at 89–94.
91. Id. at 131 (White, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 119–20.
93. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
94. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 955.
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ways.”95 Professor Lawrence Sullivan saw in NCAA a balancing test that
includes less restrictive alternatives.96 According to Professor
Hovenkamp, the Supreme Court “agreed with the lower court’s conclusion
that even if such a defense were legitimate, it could be achieved by a less
restrictive alternative.”97
The Court did note that the Tenth Circuit had relied on less restrictive
alternatives as the basis of its decision, but the Court did not adopt the
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning—it applied its own analysis, ignoring the Tenth
Circuit’s use of less restrictive alternatives in deciding the case. It is true
that the Tenth Circuit cited less restrictive alternatives, but it did so as a
second alternative holding after concluding that, in two separate ways, the
restraints had no competitive justification.98
The other claims that the NCAA case engaged in less restrictive
alternatives analysis fail to acknowledge that the only alternative the Court
considered was no restraint at all. The Court did not hold that the NCAA’s
restraints served its productive objective less effectively than they might
if structured differently; it rejected the NCAA’s restraints on their own
terms and not in comparison to some alternative form because the
restraints did not produce any procompetitive effects. 99 Because the
television restrictions reduced output rather than increased it,100 the
restrictions did not contribute to the productive activity, and so there was
no procompetitive justification for them in the first place.101 That
conclusion does not reflect the application of a less restrictive alternatives
test. If the restraints did not make any contribution to productive activity,
then there would be nothing against which to measure other less restrictive
alternatives.
That, of course, is no more that application of the ancillary restraints
doctrine itself. If the NCAA’s restraints did not in fact contribute to
productive activity, they were not ancillary to it and therefore were not
subject to the ancillary restraints doctrine.102 That is the only way to
understand the Court’s holding in NCAA, which refused to find any
procompetitive benefit from the restraints.
95. Kauper, supra note 55, at 909.
96. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 850.
97. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 369, 372 (2016).
98. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d,
NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
99. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114. Unlike the Court’s notation of the Tenth Circuit’s less restrictive
alternatives analysis, the Court actually relied on the District Court’s findings that the restraints did
not produce any procompetitive effect. See id. (citing the District Court’s findings).
100. Id. at 119.
101. Id. at 116.
102. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 11, at 346; see also Hemphill, supra note
6, at 953.
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Although the holding of the case was based on the wholesale
rejection of the restraints rather than their comparison to less restrictive
alternatives, the opinion contains language discussing alternative restraints
that one could read as including a less restrictive alternatives analysis. One
justification the NCAA offered was that the restraints maintained
competitive balance among the teams.103 The Court rejected that
justification entirely because it reduced rather than increased output,104 a
determination that did not involve comparison with less restrictive
alternatives. In the course of its discussion, though, it did cite alternatives,
largely following the District Court:
[T]he District Court found, the NCAA imposes a variety of other
restrictions designed to preserve amateurism which are much better
tailored to the goal of competitive balance than is the television plan,
and which are “clearly sufficient” to preserve competitive balance to
the extent it is within the NCAA’s power to do so.105

One might read “much better tailored” to mean “less restrictive,” but
those of us who have had our pants let out know that sometimes tailoring
does not result in making things smaller. Here, the alternatives the Court
considered looked more restrictive than the television restraints. The Court
described the various ways in which the restraint was too limited to
achieve the end of competitive balancing:
The television plan is not even arguably tailored to serve such an
interest. It does not regulate the amount of money that any college
may spend on its football program, nor the way in which the colleges
may use the revenues that are generated by their football programs,
whether derived from the sale of television rights, the sale of tickets,
or the sale of concessions or program advertising . . . . There is no
evidence that this restriction produces any greater measure of
equality throughout the NCAA than would a restriction on alumni
donations, tuition rates, or any other revenue-producing activity.106

The district court, too, had cited the “far-reaching NCAA regulations
governing college football, other than those relating to television.” In its
opinion, it listed seven different restraints that go to the core of
competition over the coaches, players, and number of games, which it
described as “only a small part of the vast NCAA regulatory scheme.”107
103. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 at 117.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. For the proposition that this language suggests a less restrictive alternatives test, see
Hemphill, supra note 6, at 955 & n.133.
106. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 119.
107. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1309 (D. Okla. 1982), rev’d,
707 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1983).
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That was the alternative that was “clearly sufficient”108 for the NCAA’s
purpose. Those restrictions covered all aspects of the games the NCAA
produced, not just the television portion, which was only part of the
NCAA’s football market. Some restraints, such as restraints on tuition,
would go to the school’s broader enterprise outside athletics entirely. It is
hard to describe these alternatives as “less”109 restrictive than a limit on
the number of games that appear on television, which is only one part of
one market in which the NCAA’s games competed.110
Looking at the alternatives considered by the Court, it appears that
there is no meaningful way to even measure whether an alternative is less
or more restrictive. Is a restriction that prevents paying players
(amateurism) more restrictive or less restrictive than a limitation on the
number of television games? How about a restriction on the amount of
donations that schools can receive or put toward their football programs?
It is hard to say. The restraints operate in completely different markets111
(television versus sports versus alumni donations versus tuition) even if
they are all designed to produce a single product.
The Court did not rely on less restrictive alternatives when it found
that the NCAA’s restrictions did not further a productive end. Instead, it
applied a standard ancillary restraint analysis to determine whether they
actually contributed to the stated justification. More significantly, there is
absolutely nothing in NCAA to suggest that consideration of less restrictive
alternatives is a distinct, much less necessary, step in rule of reason
analysis.
b. Maricopa County Medical Society
Professors Hemphill,112 Hovenkamp (in Justice Powell’s dissent),113
Ross,114 and Sullivan115 find a less restrictive alternative analysis in

108. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 119.
109. Cf. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§ 15.03 (2013 supp.) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW] (“We doubt that the Court
meant by the first quoted sentence above that colleges should adopt the less restrictive alternative of
equalizing tuition or alumni donations as a preferable way to achieve competitive balance. Rather, the
Court suggested that television revenues or exposure would not determine football strength in view of
all the other factors affecting a school’s resources and recruitment.”).
110. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 116–17 (discussing the relationship between the TV plan restraint and
the sales of tickets for live attendance).
111. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.03 (“In the NCAA situation, the
alternatives are very different qualitatively.”).
112. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 940; id. at 957.
113. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 114–15.
114. But see Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 489 (1990).
115. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 845, 851.
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Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.116 That case involved a
maximum fee schedule set by doctors. The Society offered a plan under
which doctors would agree to accept a maximum fee from insurers who
signed up for the plan. The insurers, conversely, would agree to pay the
maximum fee.117 The case revolved largely around how the Court should
treat a maximum fee schedule offered by a professional association as
opposed to some other form of price restraint, like a minimum fee
schedule.118 The Court decided that such a restraint was a per se violation
of Section 1,119 but in doing so, it considered an argument by the doctors
that their fee schedule system had procompetitive effects by providing
choice, complete coverage, and lower premiums.120 In rejecting the second
and third justifications, the Court pointed out that, while complete
coverage (and reliable prices) were benefits, they did not require the
doctors to horizontally set the price; the insurers could just as easily do so
as part of their plans’ agreement with individual doctors, and offered
examples to prove the point.121
Because the Court applied the per se rule in Maricopa County
Medical Society, it is, like Addyston Pipe, an unlikely source of wisdom
regarding the use of less restrictive alternatives in rule of reason cases.122
That is all the more so because the Court’s rejection of the doctors’
rationale was not based on the effects of the fee arrangement or its
alternatives but rather because the justification was precluded—as in
Addyston Pipe—by the per se rule.123
Even in considering alternatives, though, the Court’s analysis did not
emphasize anything like a “degree” of restrictiveness. Rather, it suggested
an alternative source for the restraint: the insurers.124 Shifting the price
setting to the insurers from the doctors would change the restraint from a
horizontal one to a vertical one and therefore subject it to an entirely
different rule (for one thing, it would not be price fixing). It is possible to
116. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Professor Hovenkamp cites
Justice Powell’s emphasis on nonexclusivity in his dissent in Maricopa County as a less restrictive
alternative. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 114–15. Justice Powell himself did not mention less
restrictive alternatives, see Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 360 (Powell, J., dissenting), and I
will address the role of nonexclusive licenses below.
117. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 341.
118. Id. at 342–57.
119. Id. at 354. For a discussion of the per se rule of reason distinction, see supra text
accompanying notes 66–70.
120. Id. at 351.
121. Id. at 352–53; see also Sullivan, supra note 53, at 845 (citing less restrictive alternatives in
Maricopa County Medical Society); id. at 851 (same).
122. Cf. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 957 (“The case is styled as a per se condemnation of the
conduct, but the Court considered the defendants’ proffered justification at length.”).
123. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 351.
124. See id. at 341.
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describe a vertical restraint as “less restrictive” than a horizontal one, but
what the Court was saying (as in NCAA) was not that the doctors’
horizontal agreement was overbroad but rather that the doctors should not
have agreed at all.125 Thus, like the comparison in NCAA, the Court
compared the doctors’ agreement not with some a less restrictive
agreement, but with no agreement. The agreement was unnecessary to
achieve the benefits of complete coverage and lower premiums, which is,
again, the standard ancillary restraint analysis without any separate
consideration of less restrictive alternatives.126 Nowhere did the Court
suggest that the doctors’ horizontal agreements are either more or less
“restrictive” than the vertical examples they offer.
c. Broadcast Music
Professors Hovenkamp (in the majority),127 and Hemphill,128 and
Sullivan129 (in Justice Stevens’ dissent) also find less restrictive
alternatives analysis in Broadcast Music, Inc., v. CBS.130 Broadcast Music
addressed the use of so-called “blanket licenses” used by performing rights
associations such as BMI and American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP), which effectively bundled together the
performance rights for all the composers who were members of the
association.131 Because the blanket licenses bundled all those composers’
rights together in a single purchase, it was conceivably price fixing among
the competing composers, a per se violation.132 The Court rejected that
characterization of the arrangement, ruling instead that the blanket licenses
created a product different from anything the individual composers sold
and so should be subject to the rule of reason.133 One basis of the Court’s
decision was that, because the blanket licenses were non-exclusive,134
composers and licensees were free to negotiate licenses for individual
songs outside the blanket license.135 Professor Hovenkamp argues that the

125. Id. at 357.
126. Id. at 351–52.
127. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 114–15.
128. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 986.
129. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 842, 850.
130. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
131. Id. at 4–5.
132. Id. at 6, 9–10.
133. Id. at 23–24.
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id. at 24.
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nonexclusive nature of the license as a less restrictive alternative was
important to the outcome in Broadcast Music.136
The Court’s use of the non-exclusive licenses in Broadcast Music
was quite different from its consideration of alternatives in NCAA and
Maricopa County Medical Society. In those cases, the existence of an
alternative regime, whether less or more restrictive, demonstrated the lack
of a necessary connection between the restraint and the procompetitive
justification as required by the ancillary restraints doctrine. In Broadcast
Music, the existence of a real versus a hypothetical alternative did not
demonstrate the lack of a connection between the blanket license and the
justification; the Court found the blanket license was in fact related to the
justification.137 Rather, the existence of the alternative demonstrated that
there could be no harm from the blanket license at all. If the blanket license
raised prices or artificially restricted output, composers and licensees
would just switch to the available alternative of direct licenses.138 The
existence of alternatives was in service of a completely different question:
whether there was anticompetitive harm in the first place.139 For its part,
the Court thought that the success of the blanket license in the face of
available alternatives demonstrated the productive benefits of the blanket
license,140 also a question unrelated to whether the license was more or
less restrictive than an alternative restraint.
Justice Stevens’ dissent at least compares the blanket license with a
less restrictive alternative,141 but his analysis is focused not on the
defendants’ procompetitive justifications but rather on the possibility that
an alternative market could exist at all. The defendants justified the blanket
license on its ability to reduce transaction costs in licensing the
performance rights by obviating the need for individual negotiations with
the composers.142 Justice Stevens’ argument is not that transaction costs
could have been reduced (similarly or at all) without the blanket license
but rather that the blanket was not necessary to having some different
market for performance rights (direct negotiation),143 placing his analysis
well outside the rule of reason.144 Demonstrating that a restraint is
136. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 115; see also Hemphill, supra note 6, at 952 (citing
nonexclusive licenses, including the specific licenses at issue in Broadcast Music, as less restrictive
alternatives but not citing Broadcast Music itself).
137. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 21–22.
138. Id. at 24.
139. 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913c.
140. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
141. Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. On the balancing inherent in the rule of reason, see Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756,
782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 124.
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necessary for the existence of a market is an impossible burden for
virtually any restraint.
d. A Notable Absence
Although references to alternatives are present in the Supreme
Court’s antitrust jurisprudence, their appearance is spotty at best. Prior to
the American Express dicta, the Court had never included a less restrictive
alternatives test in its articulation of the rule of reason, and most rule of
reason cases do not mention alternatives at all. Based on that record alone,
inferring that the rule of reason requires consideration of less restrictive
alternatives is at the very least strained. Moreover, when alternatives do
appear, their use is varied and largely informal. Occasionally the Court
recognizes problems with a restraint because it is not more restrictive, and
even when the alternatives considered are less restrictive, they are used in
the cases in a variety of ways, from implementing the ancillary restraints
doctrine to demonstrating that a restraint cannot be harmful. There is zero
affirmative support in the Supreme Court case law for consideration of less
restrictive alternatives as a distinct step in the rule of reason as suggested
by the American Express dicta and several commentators. To the contrary,
there are several instances in which the Court has refused to consider less
restrictive alternatives and has even suggested that they should not be
considered; I now turn to those instances.
3. Supreme Court Rejections of the Less Restrictive Alternatives Test
If Justice Brennan endorsed less restrictive alternatives in his dissent
in White Motor as “another pertinent inquiry”145 and Justice Stevens
implicitly approved of less restrictive alternatives in his NCAA majority
and his Broadcast Music dissent,146 Chief Justice Rehnquist was explicitly
hostile to them. In his dissent from denial of certiorari in NFL v. North
American Soccer League,147 then-Justice Rehnquist condemned a less
restrictive alternatives test on its terms.148 Although it might be tempting
to count Justices’ views (two to one), Rehnquist’s condemnation is at least
consistent with the rest of the Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence,

145. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 850.
147. Nat’l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.).
148. Id.
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unlike either Justice Brennan’s149 or Justice Stevens’s150 views on the
matter.
Most rule of reason cases do not mention less restrictive alternatives,
even when they would have been clearly relevant. Some of those
omissions are striking. In NCAA, the Tenth Circuit explicitly relied on the
existence of a less restrictive alternative, albeit as an alternative holding.
The Supreme Court noted that fact but passed up the obvious opportunity
to decide the case on that basis.151 In California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,152
the opportunity to rule based on less restrictive alternatives presented itself
even more clearly, sparking a disagreement in the Court, but the
implications for antitrust law nevertheless went unnoticed by both the
majority and dissent, including by Justice Breyer himself. In CDA, the
Court considered a partial ban on advertising by dentists.153 Although the
Court did distinguish the partial ban from a total one, it did not cite a rule
of antitrust law indicating the partial ban was more likely to be permissible
because it was less restrictive than a total one would have been.154 Justice
Breyer keyed on this aspect of the majority and criticized it for other
reasons, but he nevertheless failed to comment on how the less restrictive
alternative might alter the CDA’s liability.155
In addition to the many cases in which less restrictive alternatives are
simply not mentioned, the Court affirmatively rejected such cases in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.156 In that case, which dealt with
a vertical restraint (an exclusive dealership) instead of the horizontal
restraints at issue in NCAA, Maricopa County Medical Society, Broadcast
Music, and CDA, the Court affirmatively recognized that there might be a
less restrictive alternative to the restraint and refused to consider it for the
purpose of invalidating the restraint as a per se violation.157 But Sylvania,
like Addyston Pipe, is of limited use as precedent for the content of the
rule of reason. Although Sylvania established that the rule of reason was
applicable to vertical restraints like the exclusive dealership at issue in that

149. Compare supra note 87 (discussing Justice Brennan’s argument to include analysis of less
restrictive alternatives in White Motor, a vertical restraint case), and infra text accompanying notes
156–59 (discussing rejection of less restrictive alternatives in Sylvania, another vertical restraint case).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 141–144 (describing Justice Stevens’ incongruous use
of less restrictive alternatives in his dissent in Broadcast Music).
151. See supra text accompanying note 98.
152. See generally Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
153. Id. at 761.
154. Id. at 773–74.
155. Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
157. Id. at 58 n.29.
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case, it did not apply the rule of reason,158 so its views on less restrictive
alternatives do not necessarily read on the rule of reason itself.159
4. Informal Consideration of Less Restrictive Alternatives in the
Supreme Court
Some cases clearly do consider alternatives, albeit not as a distinct
step or a stated requirement, in the rule of reason analysis. In FTC v.
Actavis, Inc.,160 the Court held that reverse-payment settlement
agreements—settlements in which a plaintiff makes a payment to the
defendant, often as part of an agreement under which the defendant agrees
not to compete with the plaintiff, which raises antitrust concerns161—are
subject to the rule of reason.162 One concern with the rule was that the
threat of antitrust liability and the prospect of antitrust litigation would
prevent parties from settling lawsuits.163 The Court disclaimed the risk to
settlement by highlighting that the availability of alternatives to the “large,
unjustified reverse payment[s]”164 meant that parties could still settle
without worrying about running afoul of the antitrust laws. In so doing,
the Court suggested that “the generic manufacturer [could] enter the
patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee
paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”165 If the Court meant
that litigants using another form of settlement would avoid liability under
the rule of reason, then it was at least suggesting that it will, when
confronted with such a case, ask whether the parties used something less
restrictive than a reverse payment. Doing so would require that courts
permit antitrust defendants to offer less restrictive alternatives in defense
of their settlements.166
But the Court in Actavis did not mention a less restrictive alternatives
test, instead emphasizing the possibility that the existence of alternatives
might be principally useful for determining the parties’ intent:
Although the parties may have reasons to prefer settlements that
include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What are
158. Id. at 59.
159. See also 7 ANTITRUST LAW (1st ed.), supra note 23, ¶ 1505 at 386 (arguing that Sylvania’s
comments relate to the problem of applying the per se rule to one of two similar restraints); Hemphill,
supra note 6, at 940 n.63 (same).
160. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
161. See id. at 140–41.
162. Id. at 159–60.
163. See id. at 170 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 158.
165. Id.
166. Cf. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 940 (noting Actavis’s identification of less restrictive
alternatives but not describing how they would operate in the rule of reason).
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those reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share
patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other
justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.167

By highlighting the parties’ “reasons” for the payment, one could
argue all the Court did was invoke the ancillary restraints doctrine,
identifying that the settlement payment was not ancillary to productive
activity but rather was a “naked” agreement to “to maintain and to share
patent-generated monopoly profits.”168 That would not be a use of
alternatives in the rule of reason but rather in the ancillary restraint inquiry,
which as I describe below,169 is probably the correct way to think about
them.170
Another case in which the Court actually discussed less restrictive
alternatives was Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.171
In Fortner, the Court specifically called out the availability of less
restrictive alternatives as one component of the law of tying:
The[] decisions rejecting the need for proof of truly dominant power
over the tying product have all been based on a recognition that
because tying arrangements generally served no legitimate business
purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the
presence of any appreciable restraint on competition provides a
sufficient reason for invalidating the tie.172

Both Professor Hemphill and Professor Messe noted Fortner’s
recognition of less restrictive alternatives.173
Fortner’s use of less restrictive alternatives seems quite
unproblematic, but it has little to do with the rule of reason for two key
reasons: First, the case was decided under the modified per se rule for
tying, not the rule of reason.174 Second, the Court’s consideration of
alternatives was categorical; it was a rejection of tying generally, which is
why it could be subjected to modified per se treatment. It was not a
consideration of any particular form of tying with regard to any particular
167. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158.
168. Id.
169. See infra Part III.
170. The Court’s recitation of less restrictive alternatives does also raise a second possibility:
that courts should look to the amount of a settlement to determine its validity. See Actavis, 570 U.S.
at 158. Such a use is disclaimed even by proponents of a less restrictive alternatives test. Hovenkamp,
supra note 97, at 376–77; see infra Section II.A.
171. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
172. Id. at 503.
173. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 939 n.58; Meese, supra note 22, at 127 n.264.
174. Fortner, 394 U.S. at 500–01 (citing the per se rule for tying); see also Stanley D. Robinson,
Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 191, 231–32 (1976) (arguing the less
restrictive alternatives concept in the Supreme Court had its origins in tying cases).
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defendant or in service of any particular productive justification or, for that
matter, with regard to any particular alternative.175 Fortner did rely on the
existence of alternatives to justify the modified per se rule, but it did not
actually compare any alternatives to the tie at issue.176
It is hard to develop a comprehensive understanding about less
restrictive alternatives in the rule of reason from the Supreme Court cases
because less restrictive alternatives are often not mentioned at all,
including in both opinions in CDA, still the leading case on how to perform
the rule of reason. There is simply no support in Supreme Court antitrust
jurisprudence for the use of less restrictive alternatives as a formal step in
the rule of reason, much less in the way commentators would have them
used: as a categorical rejection of the defendant’s proffered justification
because it could be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative. The
Court mentions alternatives (less, equally, or even more restrictive, as in
NCAA) as an analytical tool when they are helpful, and the facts of the
particular case lend themselves to it and ignores them when they are not.
The question remains whether there is a broader place within antitrust
analysis for less restrictive alternatives even if they are not a distinct step
in the rule of reason.
E. Alternatives, Balancing, and Ancillary Restraints
Answering what role less restrictive alternatives might have in
antitrust starts with determining what their purpose might be. According
to Professor Hemphill, courts have turned to less restrictive alternatives
partly out of discomfort at the rise of the formless balancing test created
in Chicago Board of Trade177 combined with Chicago School doubts over
balancing.178 Recognition of the difficulties inherent in balancing
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects have only grown over time,
with scholars, commentators, and judges179 becoming increasingly
skeptical that any real balance could take place.180 In light of this balancing

175. Indeed, under the applicable standard, a different restraint would only be meaningfully “less
restrictive” if it were not a tie—its form would be more important than its overall restrictiveness, since
its form would determine whether it received the rule of reason or per se treatment. A comparatively
less restrictive tie would have been equally unlawful.
176. As it happens, the Court eventually upheld the tie at issue in Fortner without considering
less restrictive alternatives. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977).
177. On the role of balancing in Chicago Board of Trade and in antitrust since then, see
Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 122, 132.
178. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 947–49.
179. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1986); FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.04[A]; Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14 (1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 133.
180. Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 373.
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issue, less restrictive alternatives might be an alternative to balancing181 or
maybe even a shorthand way to perform it.182
But if less restrictive alternatives are a shortcut to balancing as
Professor Hemphill suggests, they are a futile alternative because they
raise exactly the same problems of less-structured balancing
approaches.183 Rather, the analysis that courts seem to be undertaking
through less restrictive alternatives—as suggested by the many citations
of Addyston Pipe as the source of less restrictive alternatives in antitrust
law184—seems to be more closely tied to the ancillary restraints doctrine
than to the net competitive effect balancing of Chicago Board of Trade.
As a method for implementing the ancillary restraints doctrine, less
restrictive alternatives can indeed help to alleviate anxiety over balancing
the same way the ancillary restraints doctrine itself does: by denying the
connection between a restraint and a productive justification, either
rendering the restraint per se illegal or, at the very least, breaking the
causal chain between the restraint and a putative procompetitive “benefit”
that has to be weighed in any ultimate balancing.
When one observes how the Supreme Court applies less restrictive
alternatives, the connection to the ancillary restraints doctrine becomes
clear: Ancillary restraint analysis looks more like what the Court was
doing in cases that are frequently cited as examples of less restrictive
alternatives analysis, such as NCAA and Maricopa County Medical
Society, in both of which the Court held that the restraints did not
contribute to the productive justification at all.185 The same is true of
Actavis.186
Whether the ancillary restraints doctrine should relieve one’s anxiety
over balancing is questionable. Like net effects balancing itself, the
ancillary restraints doctrine is indeterminate at its margins.187 Addyston
Pipe is full of uses of “reasonable” and “necessary” and “reasonably
necessary,” none of which are particularly determinate terms; the ultimate
question under the ancillary restraints doctrine is what to make of those
terms. The present question, however, is what less restrictive alternatives
can contribute to that inquiry.
181. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 134.
182. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 952–53.
183. Id. at 961.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 74–85.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 98–111 (NCAA), 122–123 (Maricopa County Medical
Society).
186. See supra text accompanying note 168.
187. See Horner v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831) (“[N]o certain precise boundary
can be laid down, within which the restraint would be reasonable and beyond which, excessive.”);
Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 57, at 343.
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Lacking formal recognition by the court, consideration of less
restrictive alternatives is a practice, not a doctrine. With a picture of how
the Court does use less restrictive alternatives in antitrust, the next
question is whether and how the Court should use less restrictive
alternatives in antitrust. Answering that question requires assessing less
restrictive alternatives on their own terms.
II. LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES ON THEIR OWN TERMS
While the less restrictive alternatives test may lack a doctrinal basis
in the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence, there remains the question
of whether it nevertheless has merit in antitrust analysis. Because the test
has never been consistently applied and has largely escaped the Supreme
Court’s notice until recently, the merits of the less restrictive alternatives
test have not been the subject of protracted debate. That lack of attention
has allowed the less restrictive alternatives test to flourish in an
environment in which its boundaries have not been adequately tested
through application. Examination of those boundaries reveals two
observations about them: (1) that they are acknowledged by the test’s
proponents to be undefined, and (2) that the few courts that have applied
the less restrictive alternatives test have described those boundaries
inconsistently. These observations present especially large problems for a
method of analysis that emphasizes a continuing comparison: a search for
alternatives that are comparatively “less” restrictive than some alternative.
Without clearly defined boundaries, there is nothing to prevent a
comparative test like the less restrictive alternatives test from collapsing
into an ever-more-exacting inquiry into alternatives, if not during a
particular case then over time with regard to a set of restraints. The few
cases that have actually applied the test demonstrate exactly that problem.
The inability to describe the test’s boundaries is an integral feature of the
test, meaning that the only sound conclusion is to reject the less restrictive
alternatives test as a step in the rule of reason.
After considering practical arguments over less restrictive
alternatives, I explain why the Supreme Court should end its recent
flirtation with the less restrictive alternatives test.
A. Practical Arguments Over Less Restrictive Alternatives
Opponents of less restrictive alternatives have leveled a number of
practical critiques against them, arguing that even if a less restrictive
alternative test could be successfully codified in doctrine, society would
not want to do so. Proponents have responded in kind. Most of these
arguments are about how to credit the defendant’s productive justification.
For instance, Professor Devlin cautions that using less restrictive
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alternatives could result in a situation in which a defendant actually
improves consumer welfare but, because it does so in a less than optimally
restrictive way, violates antitrust law.188 That concern rings true to antitrust
law, which generally privileges defendants’ goals, especially in Section 2
cases.189 It might seem at first blush unlikely that a court would completely
ignore the defendant’s goal in adopting a restraint when considering less
restrictive alternatives, but that appears to be what Justice Stevens did in
his Broadcast Music dissent.190 Excessive focus on alternative restraints
may very well turn courts’ attention away from focusing on productive
justifications. Concern over how they might do so is generally broken
down into two categories: (1) concern that courts might second-guess
defendants’ ex ante judgments with ex post hindsight, and (2) concern that
courts might conduct too fine-grained analyses of alternatives.
The ex ante/ex post criticisms of a less restrictive alternatives test191
is that courts will second-guess defendants, subjecting them to treble
damages for failing to anticipate what eventually turned out not to be a
less restrictive alternative. That second-guessing might charge firms with
failing to adopt an alternative that might not have been obvious or even
available at the time the defendant adopted the challenged practice.192
A separate set of criticisms focus on either the potential that courts
will use the existence of a slightly less restrictive alternative to invalidate
a restraint entirely or will allow less restrictive restraints even if they do
not serve the productive justification as well. Whether as to
restrictiveness193 or efficacy194 (or both)195, these criticisms are about
incrementalism—the magnitude of the difference between a challenged
restraint and a proposed less restrictive alternative.196 Proponents of less
188. Devlin, supra note 23, at 824.
189. Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 371–72.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 141–144.
191. Carrier, supra note 19, at 1337; Feldman, supra note 22, at 587–88.
192. Feldman, supra note 22, at 603.
193. See id. at 597 (“It is always conceivable that there is a more efficient method for achieving
the procompetitive impact of a restraint—there is always a sharper needle in the haystack.”).
194. See Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 57, at 343 (“[E]ven where an alternative is clearly less
restrictive, there may be serious doubt whether it is sufficient for its appointed task, or is the least
costly choice.”).
195. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.03 (“Occasionally, these
questions can be answered yes or no with assurance, but often there will be perplexing differences of
degree. The restraint may promote the legitimate objective clearly or only indirectly or modestly or
somewhere in between. An alternative may be only slightly less restrictive, slightly more costly, or
slightly less effective, or greatly so.”).
196. See id. (“The key difficulty in examining less restrictive alternatives lies in deciding how
refined a distinction to make among the possible alternatives available to the defendants.”); Arthur,
Sea of Doubt, supra note 57, at 343 (describing the potential that less restrictive alternatives might
leave “no margin for error” by antitrust defendants).
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restrictive alternatives are quick to disclaim exactly such fine-grained
analysis as unworkable.197
The problem posed by incrementalism is hardly hypothetical; it was
a major feature of the O’Bannon198 litigation and has been resurrected in
the Ninth Circuit’s application of O’Bannon’s less restrictive alternatives
approach in another case addressing NCAA player compensation rules:
Alston v. NCAA.199 O’Bannon dealt with the use of college football
players’ names, images, and likenesses (NILs) in the marketing of video
games based on college football and men’s basketball.200 The practice has
generated substantial revenue, but NCAA amateurism rules prohibit
compensating players for the use of their likenesses.201 In O’Bannon, the
court considered two less restrictive alternatives to not paying athletes at
all for the use of their likeness: (1) increasing the maximum athletic
scholarship from tuition and fees, room and board, and other schoolrequired costs, such as books to the “full cost of attendance,” which, in
addition, includes “[nonrequired] books and supplies, transportation, and
other expenses related to attendance at the institution,”202 and (2) deferred
cash compensation set at $5,000.203 The NCAA (with help from amici)
argued that consideration of either less restrictive alternative would “open
the floodgates to new lawsuits demanding all manner of incremental
changes,”204 an argument that literally reads in incrementalism. The
specific less restrictive alternative of $5,000 of deferred compensation
raises the incremental question of whether $5,001 would not have been
even less restrictive than that, and Professor Hovenkamp has criticized the
district court’s remedy of a $5,000 floor on compensation restrictions as
“really nothing more than disguised price administration.”205
The Ninth Circuit upheld the increase scholarship limits to full cost
of attendance but rejected the cash payments because they defeated the
NCAA’s procompetitive justification of protecting amateurism, which is
at the core of the product they sell. The court’s rejection is in the language

197. See Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 376–77 (“For example, if members of a joint venture are
found to be unlawfully fixing prices at ten dollars, lowering the price to eight dollars is not the type of
less restrictive alternative contemplated by antitrust law.”).
198. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
199. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Litig. (Alston), 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub
nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
200. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1054 & n.3.
203. Id. at 1074.
204. Id. at 1075.
205. Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 376.
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of less restrictive alternatives,206 but its logic sounds in ancillary restraints,
since the problem with the alternative was not that it was marginally less
effective or more expensive but rather that it would defeat the entire
productive justification for the NCAA’s arrangement (and indeed, for the
NCAA itself).207
If one takes the NCAA’s justification seriously, though, then it is not
clear what separates the $5,000 from the “full cost of attendance” remedy,
at least from the standpoint of incrementalism. If amateurism is the
justification for excluding the $5,000 payments, then any payment up to
the level of defeating amateurism would be a less restrictive alternative.
The court took that line to be “full cost of attendance,” but it is not clear
why it did so. The existence of the Amateur Sports Act, which prohibits
the use of “eligibility criteria related to amateur status or to
participation . . . that are more restrictive than those of the appropriate
international sports federation”208 demonstrates that there are multiple
definitions of amateurism. In the follow-on Alston case, the Ninth Circuit
truly threaded the needle by distinguishing, for instance, between the form
of the compensation (cash or non-cash) prohibiting any limit on non-cash
compensation like post-eligibility, post-graduate scholarships, even for
study at other schools.209
If the NCAA’s justification for amateurism is consumer demand,
then its level of justification should fluctuate with consumer perception,
fluctuations that played a major role in Alston. The district court, after
pointing out that the NCAA actually allowed some cash compensation for
students without a demonstrated change in consumer perception,
permitted only those NCAA cash compensation limits that were no lower
than the current ones, essentially locking in the current dollar amount, at
$5,600 to be precise.210 The approach underling this ruling opened the door
to experiments in consumer perception at the level of dollars, not type of
compensation. One wonders when the Alston plaintiffs will return with a
new economic study showing that a hypothetical $1,000 (or $1) increase
206. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076 (“The question is whether the alternative of allowing students
to be paid NIL compensation unrelated to their education expenses, is ‘virtually as effective’ in
preserving amateurism as not allowing compensation.”).
207. Id. (“Both we and the district court agree that the NCAA’s amateurism rule has
procompetitive benefits. But in finding that paying students cash compensation would promote
amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the district court ignored that not paying student-athletes
is precisely what makes them amateurs.”); id. at 1078 (calling any cash payment unconnected to
academic expenses a “quantum leap”).
208. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(15).
209. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058,
1088 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S.
Ct. 2141 (2021).
210. Id. On the $5,600 amount, see id. at 1072, 1099.
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to the current limits would not change consumer perception.211 Alston
itself represents just such a case: a follow-up to O’Bannon brought by
plaintiffs seeking to further limit the NCAA’s compensation rules from
limits on NIL compensation to “dismantl[ing] the NCAA’s entire
compensation framework.”212 From the perspective of incrementalism,
compensation up to full cost of attendance has the same potential for
judicial price regulation as cash (and non-cash) payments. In both
O’Bannon and Alston, nothing about the degree of change (in
restrictiveness, efficacy, or cost) distinguishes the two; the only difference
is in the connection to the NCAA’s productive justification, which is
exactly the question addressed by the ancillary restraints doctrine.213
The incrementalism problem is everywhere in less restrictive
alternatives; even if a court avoids the incrementalism problem as a matter
of liability, it is impossible to ignore as a matter of remedy. As the Ninth
Circuit explained in O’Bannon, once a restraint is invalidated because
there is a less restrictive alternative, “an antitrust court can and should
invalidate it and order it replaced with a less restrictive alternative.”214
When choosing a remedy, courts will have to order a new restraint. The
Ninth Circuit rule, which is typical, seeks to cabin the incrementalism
problem by requiring less restrictive alternatives to be “substantially less
restrictive” than the challenged restraint,215 a limitation the Supreme Court
keyed on in its affirmance in Alston.216 But when the district court applies
a remedy, the defendant’s restraint will be off the table, so there will be
nothing to measure substantiality against. Without an established restraint
to compare to, the less restrictive alternative approach will necessarily
drive the court to look for the least restrictive way to fulfill the defendant’s
211. Such marginal changes to consumer perception might be outside the NCAA’s control. The
Ninth Circuit noted in Alston that California had, since the lower court Alston decision, adopted the
Fair Pay to Play Act, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (2023), requiring the NCAA to permit colleges to
pay students for the use of their names, images, and likenesses, one of the restrictions upheld in
O’Bannon for its contribution to the NCAA’s amateurism justification. See Alston, 958 F.3d at 1252.
The court refused to discount the NCAA’s justifications by virtue of its efforts to comply with the
California law, which does not take effect until 2023. Id. If California succeeds in changing consumer
perception of college athletics (which was the touchstone relied on in both the O’Bannon and Alston
cases) as encompassing player compensation for NILs, will the Ninth Circuit in 2024 hold the NCAA
liable for the same restriction it upheld in O’Bannon?
212. Alston, 958 F.3d at 1247.
213. As for the ancillary restraints question itself, it is not clear O’Bannon got that right either
because the court failed to explain why full cost of attendance had anything to do with compensation
for the use of students’ likenesses. The court did not even attempt to connect the increase in
compensation (the difference between the old cost of attendance cap to the new, full cost of attendance
cap) to the use of student likenesses.
214. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
215. Id. at 1064.
216. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2162 (2021).
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procompetitive justification. If the restraint is in the form of a price, then
the district court will have to set that amount, as it did in Alston itself.217
If the court retains jurisdiction, the quest for a less restrictive
alternative will effectively convert the court into a price regulator, a
function that the Court has specifically prohibited in antitrust cases.218
Alston again provides the example. The district court’s $5,600 floor on
NCAA limits on cash compensation did not even last the course of the
Alston litigation. While the case was still pending on appeal, the parties
returned to the district court to explain that the NCAA had indeed been
allowing a higher compensation of $5,980.219 The district court
accordingly revised its previous order, naming the new, higher floor and
retaining jurisdiction to do so again in the future.220
The argument from incrementalism is really an argument about
stability: introducing less restrictive alternatives destabilizes both
planning and markets themselves because all restraints will be open to
challenge by virtue of the existence of a less restrictive alternative. That
instability operates not just across restraints but over time. Professors
Carrier and Feldman make this point explicitly in their emphasis on ex post
examination that results in hindsight bias.221 One need not look further
than Broadcast Music and Justice Stevens’ dissent to demonstrate just how
much time combined with less restrictive alternatives analysis can
invalidate a restraint. As Professor Hemphill points out, the less restrictive
alternatives that Justice Stevens pointed to—individualized licenses—
were impractical at the time the case was decided but would not be now.222
Including less restrictive alternatives in the analysis will require courts to
confront what to do with such temporal changes.223 Will a restraint that
was legal in the 1970s become the subject of treble damages today? Will
217. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058,
1107–08 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141
S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
218. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
219. See Order Granting Motion for Clarification of Injunction, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-inAid Cap Litig. (Alston), No. 14-md-02541 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2020), ECF No. 1329. The district court
offered a confusing “clarification” that the NCAA could lower the cap without returning to the court
for permission so long as it also lowers athletic participation award levels. Id. at 6. But that clarification
is at odds with the district court’s own reasoning, which is that the $5,600 (now $5,980) compensation
limit is consistent with the NCAA’s amateurism justification. Alston, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1088. If the
NCAA can preserve amateurism with a $5,980 floor, then anything lower would be more restrictive
than necessary to do so.
220. Order Granting Motion for Clarification of Injunction, In re Alston, No. 14-md-02541 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 30, 2020), ECF No. 1329.
221. See Carrier, supra note 19, at 1337; Feldman, supra note 22, at 608.
222. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 986.
223. Id.
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firms be required to proactively monitor changes in technology and update
their policies and contracts over time in order to avoid antitrust liability?
Proponents of less restrictive alternatives acknowledge these
concerns and counter with limitations on the use of less restrictive
alternatives to limit overreach. Professor Hovenkamp has argued for a
number of limits on less restrictive alternatives analysis to prevent it from
completely undermining defendants’ ability to offer procompetitive
justifications:
[P]laintiffs cannot be permitted to offer possible less restrictive
alternatives whose efficacy is mainly a matter of speculation. A
skilled lawyer would have little difficulty imagining possible less
restrictive alternatives to most joint arrangements. Proffered less
restrictive alternatives should either be based on actual experience in
analogous situations elsewhere or else be fairly obvious. Tending to
defeat such an offering would be the defendant’s evidence that the
proffered alternative has been tried but failed, that it is equally or
more restrictive, or otherwise unlawful.224

Whether a court is capable of applying any of these limitations is
unclear. The only citation Professor Hovenkamp offers for what all agree
is a critical limitation on less restrictive alternatives analysis is a dissent
arguing that less restrictive alternatives are inherently incapable of
verification beyond a “tinkerer’s assurance that . . . competitive balance
will be achieved in the years to come,”225 which is a criticism that goes to
the core of less restrictive alternatives, not their margins.
Professor Hemphill argues that courts can protect defendants from
harmful less restrictive alternatives by insisting that less restrictive
alternatives be “dominant,” which is to say that they serve the business
interest equally as well as the challenged restraint.226 He cites the
O’Bannon court as an example,227 and the Ninth Circuit did hold that its
preferred less restrictive alternatives, capping student compensation at full
cost of attendance, was just as effective at preserving amateurism as the
NCAA’s restraint of paying just the cost of attendance.228 But that
224. 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913b; see also NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct.
2141, 2161 (2021) (citing this Hovenkamp passage); Easterbrook, supra note 179, at 9 (“If it is hard
to find what a given practice does, it is impossible to determine the difference in efficiency between a
known practice and some hypothetical alternative.”); Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57
ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 863 (1988) (arguing for a less restrictive alternatives test but that the “alternative
must be clearly preferable”).
225. ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913b n.11 (quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
226. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 928–29.
227. Id. at 944.
228. See supra text accompanying note 207.
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formulation only goes to one side of the comparison for efficacy versus
incremental restrictiveness and, more importantly, was not the Ninth
Circuit’s formulation of the rule, which was “virtually as effective”229 and
leaves room open for subdominant alternatives.
In the end, for every objection predicting that less restrictive
alternatives will lead to the demise of antitrust and markets, there is an
equally plausible and equally non-falsifiable claim that less restrictive
alternatives can be practically cabined to keep that from happening. Given
how inconsistently less restrictive alternatives have been applied, their
widespread and systematic use remains hypothetical, leaving both
opponents and proponents with little evidence on which to base either
predictions or prescriptions. Professor Hovenkamp gives up on trying to
formulate a precise rule, acknowledging the indeterminacy of less
restrictive alternatives, claiming “[o]ften, we can only speculate”230 before
leaving the topic with an admonishment to moderation:
The situations are too various to permit hard and fast rules. But we
must try to avoid each extreme: refusing to consider the legitimate
objective whenever the plaintiff questions its connection to the
restraint or names an apparently less restrictive alternative; or
tolerating every restraint whenever the defendant states a plausible
connection with a legitimate objective and claims that the alternatives
are unsatisfactory. Both are inconsistent with the purpose of the rule
of reason.231

Proponents readily acknowledge that there must be some leeway, or
buffer, between the challenged restraint and a proposed alternative before
the existence of the alternative leads to prohibition of the challenged
restraint.232 The inability of either courts or commentators to describe not
only the size of that buffer but also how one might even measure it casts
doubt on the ability of courts to apply it reliably.
Whether as an added step or just a feature of rule of reason analysis,
less restrictive alternatives systematically favor plaintiffs and disfavor
defendants, so the real question is whether the virtual impossibility of a
least restrictive alternatives test is avoidable through as-yet-unspecified
limitations on the application of the concept. As an added step, less
restrictive alternatives essentially give plaintiffs a mulligan. Under the rule
of reason as described in CDA, if defendants demonstrate their restraints

229. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).
230. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.03, at 15–20.
231. Id. § 15.03[B], at 15-23 to 15-24.
232. 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913b; Hemphill, supra note 6, at 962.
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have procompetitive justifications, then the court goes on to balancing.233
Adding a less restrictive alternatives test would allow plaintiffs to preempt
that balancing step by showing a less restrictive alternative,234 a major but
unspoken shift away from CDA’s approach to the rule of reason. If
plaintiffs show a less restrictive alternative, they win.235 If they do not, the
court then moves on to balancing.236 Defendants, on the other hand, would
never be able be able to avoid liability simply by showing there is no less
restrictive alternative,237 because the balancing step would still require
them to show their restraint is, on the whole, procompetitive. The
arguments for and against adding a less restrictive alternatives test to the
rule of reason are steeped in concerns over antitrust policy238 and should
be considered accordingly. A full examination of the wisdom of expanding
antitrust liability generally, or relying on the particular device of less
restrictive alternatives to do so, is beyond the scope of this Article, but it
is possible to draw three specific lessons for both law and policy.
The first is the point above about the role of a less restrictive
alternatives test. Adding such a test necessarily makes antitrust law more
restrictive of defendants’ conduct. Proponents of less restrictive
alternatives, opponents of less restrictive alternatives, and courts should
keep that in mind when considering whether and how to consider less
restrictive alternatives in antitrust law. It is a shift from the balancing as
currently applied by the Supreme Court since Chicago Board of Trade.239
Second, although proponents of less restrictive alternatives disclaim
a “least” restrictive alternatives test, there is no reliable way to prevent a
“less” restrictive alternatives test from sliding toward a “least” restrictive
alternatives test.240 A least restrictive alternatives test is clearly
233. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring). On the place
of Justice Breyer’s formulation of the rule of reason, see Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 124.
234. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058,
1108 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).
235. 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 33, ¶ 1913b (“Once a suitable less restrictive
alternative is found, the ordinary remedy is a declaration that the challenged restriction is
unreasonable . . . .”).
236. 7 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 26, ¶ 1507a.
237. Of course, doing so would likely be impossible, since showing there is no less restrictive
alternatives would require the defendant to prove a negative. See 11 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra
note 33, ¶ 1914c. But see id. at 409 (“But the difference in assignment of this proof burden is more
apparent than real.”).
238. See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 55, at 909.
239. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756, 791 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Chicago Bd. of
Trade, 246 U.S. at 238); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 131–33.
240. Some have cited examples from constitutional law. See Hemphill, supra note 6, at 946 &
n.89; id. at 962. But many of those cases apply a form of heightened scrutiny. Even in the most
deferential forms of review, though, the Court has found it difficult to prevent comparisons like less
restrictive alternatives from rising to the level of “least” restrictive alternatives. If one were going to
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inconsistent with antitrust law, as recognized by virtually every court to
consider the matter.241 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself disclaimed applying
the standard in O’Bannon.242 But proponents of the less restrictive
alternatives test have no principled or reliable way to prevent “less” from
devolving into “least.”243
Third, a less restrictive alternatives test will not have an equal effect
on all industries. Less restrictive alternatives will have an outsized impact
on restraints related to intangible products, such as the licenses at issue in
Broadcast Music, or the broadcast rights in NCAA, since there is no
necessary minimal unit subject to sale.
The challenges for intangible products have particular implications
for high technology businesses, including those recently subjected to
increased antitrust scrutiny, such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Google.244 Many of those businesses operate as “platforms.”245 One
characteristic of two-sided platforms is that the structure of their pricing
might look very different to the two sides of the platform.246 A newspaper
or web portal, for instance, might charge advertisers for access to
consumers while giving away their product to consumers for free.247 At

replace arguably problematic rule of reason balancing with some other form of inquiry into the
reasonableness of a restraint, it would not be with a less restrictive alternatives test, which is the
strictest form of “reasonableness” there is. In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has used
a similar method to invalidate legislation even under its most deferential “rational basis” tests by
highlighting the relative, vs. the absolute, efficacy of a provision. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Rational
Basis “Plus”, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 473–74 (2017). As demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s
use of increasingly impossible rationality tests in the constitutional context, the identification of some
(hypothetical) alternative is an easy way to demonstrate the irrationality of any proposed restraint (or
regulation) because every restraint (or regulation) is somewhat overly restrictive at the margin.
241. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.29 (1977) (upholding
restraint while concluding that it is “neither the least nor the most restrictive provision”); Bruce Drug,
Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 860 (1st Cir. 1982); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975).
242. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 224–232.
244. See David McCabe, Cecilia Kang & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google’s Legal Peril Grows in
Face of Third Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/
technology/google-antitrust-monopoly.html [https://perma.cc/3H9S-9R9N] (recounting recent
antitrust suits and investigations against these firms).
245. See MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L., H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 6 (Comm. Print.
2020) (specifically naming Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google and describing them as
“platforms”). On the problems of applying antitrust to platforms, see Thomas B. Nachbar, Platform
Effects, supra note 3.
246. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N 990, 1017 (2003).
247. Id. at 1013–18; Geoffrey G. Parker and Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Two-Sided Network
Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494, 1496 (2005).
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the same time, the network effects that give platforms their value are likely
to result in high market concentrations.248
As a result, tech markets are likely to include firms that have both a
high degree of concentration and pricing structures that do not accurately
reflect their costs, at least as the pricing structures relate to each side of
their platform. That is roughly the situation that was presented in Ohio v.
American Express,249 a case that resulted in sharp division on the Court
and much scholarly criticism.250
The economics of platforms are such that they have to charge
supracompetitive prices on one side of the platform, which will provide
anticompetitive effects in the form of higher prices on that side of the
platform. Platform defendants will have to defend the precise combination
of prices they have chosen relative to cost, a problem of incrementalism.
The relative difficulty of defending any particular allocation of costs will
present considerable risk of destabilizing platform markets which, whether
or not one thinks are adequately competitive, are undeniably large and
important to the economy and are likely to only become more so.251
The more general risk to tech markets comes from the intangible
nature of the products and services they produce. Although many of the
cases cited for less restrictive alternatives are horizontal cases, it is in the
vertical context that normally receives more permissive antitrust review,
in which less restrictive alternatives present the greatest risk to established
antitrust law because of the difficulty of specifying what is and is not less
restrictive with regard to the intangible products produced by today’s “big
tech” economy. Justice Stevens’ less-restrictive-alternative-inspired
thought experiment on music licensing252 is the only example of that
anyone needs. To the extent that less restrictive alternatives present
problems of incrementalism, those problems will be exacerbated in the
“big tech” markets.
Moreover, as technology changes, the ability to tailor restraints
similarly changes. Consequently, a doctrine that looks to less restrictive
alternatives will have a greater impact on industries in which technology
is changing more rapidly.

248. See Kate Collyer, Hugh Mullan & Natalie Timan, Measuring Market Power in Multi-Sided
Markets, ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2017 at 1, 3; Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and
Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1078 (2019).
249. Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
250. See Nachbar, supra note 3, at 21 (collecting sources).
251. Id. at 1–4.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 142–144.
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B. Leaving Less Restrictive Alternatives at the Altar
As should be clear from the foregoing, the Supreme Court’s ongoing
flirtation with less restrictive alternatives is both unconsidered and illadvised. Although less restrictive alternatives have certainly been brought
into the Supreme Court’s rule of reason lexicon through both Justices’
American Express dicta, that invocation was only possible because of the
lack of argumentation on the question in the case,253 and the Court’s
application of less restrictive alternatives in Alston was supported only by
that American Express dicta.254 Further examination reveals that the use of
less restrictive alternatives as a distinct step in a rule of reason analysis has
no support in Supreme Court antitrust precedent, and evaluation of how
less restrictive alternatives would work demonstrates why they are missing
from the Supreme Court case law.
At their worst, less restrictive alternatives invite exactly the kind of
judicial second-guessing objected to by opponents and disclaimed by
proponents. Without a principled way to prevent “less” restrictive from
becoming “least” restrictive, there is little assurance that courts will know
when to stop comparing alternatives. If one could show that less restrictive
alternatives tests actually produce better balancing than the rule of reason
currently does, the less restrictive alternatives test might be worth the risk.
As shown below, though, less restrictive alternatives actually contribute
little to the rule of reason. There simply is no good reason to invite courts
to engage in antitrust analysis influenced more by hindsight bias than
anything else, with potential antitrust defendants required to make
business decisions knowing that if a less restrictive alternative to that
decision is later identified, their mistakes will result in treble damages.
Even at their best, though, the less restrictive alternatives test replicates
the problems inherent in rule of reason balancing.
One purported advantage to a less restrictive alternatives test is that
it seemingly avoids the incommensurability problems255 of comparing
anticompetitive effects to procompetitive justifications, since the
comparison remains among restraints.256 But adding a less restrictive
alternatives test does not resolve the incommensurability problem.257 Like
rule of reason balancing, less restrictive alternatives require a comparison.
That comparison is ostensibly simpler because it is limited to comparing
253. See supra text accompanying notes 12–14.
254. See supra text accompanying note 16.
255. Easterbrook, supra note 179, at 2; Feldman, supra note 22, at 575; Hovenkamp, supra note
4, at 131–33.
256. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 952; Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 134.
257. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1,
45–48 (2016) (noting how burden-shifting, including less restrictive alternatives analysis, simply
moves the commensurability problem earlier in the rule of reason inquiry).
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two anticompetitive effects rather than comparing anticompetitive effects
with procompetitive effects. But the less restrictive alternatives test does
not just compare the anticompetitive effects of two restraints; it compares
the relative anticompetitive effects between two restraints.258 Most
formulations of the rule include some measure of efficacy.259 Because two
different restraints can also produce different procompetitive effects, the
comparison between alternative restraints reintroduces procompetitive
justifications into the analysis, obviating any advantage by avoiding
comparing incommensurable anticompetitive harms and procompetitive
benefits. The less restrictive alternatives test both reintroduces the
incommensurability problem and resurrects the uncertainty of balancing
more generally.260
Another reason why the comparison among alternatives cannot
escape the indeterminacy inherent in rule of reason balancing is because
“no restraint” is always a less restrictive alternative to a challenged
restraint. Consequently, courts will necessarily evaluate the productive
value of the restraint in the first place. That much is demonstrated by many
of the mistaken citations to cases like NCAA,261 Maricopa County Medical
Society,262 and Justice Stevens’ dissent in Broadcast Music263 as involving
less restrictive alternatives tests when the comparison was in fact between
the restraint as presented and no restraint at all.
But, even if limited solely to anticompetitive effects, comparison
among restraints is similarly incommensurable because, unless one
restraint is identical to another in kind and simply more restrictive in
magnitude—such as a comparison between a cartel of two firms versus a
cartel of three—there is no single criterion for evaluating the
restrictiveness of a restraint.
Take the Court’s analysis in NCAA. Proponents of less restrictive
alternatives cite that case for consideration of less restrictive
alternatives,264 but the alternatives the Court considered were extremely
258. See Feldman, supra note 22, at 587.
259. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring less
restrictive alternatives to be “virtually as effective” as the challenged restraint).
260. Professor Hemphill seeks to avoid this problem by insisting that only “dominant” less
restrictive alternatives be considered, but determining whether an alternative is indeed dominant is not
itself a form of analysis but rather is a conclusion resulting from comparison of the likely
procompetitive effects of the restraints, which reintroduces the incommensurability problem of
comparing restrictions and benefits. Professor Hemphill acknowledges as much in his description of
how courts actually use less restrictive alternatives, as “engaged in balancing in disguise.” Hemphill,
supra note 6, at 930.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 89–111.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 112–123.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 141–144.
264. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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restrictive. The restraint in question limited the supply of televised games
and likely raised their prices.265 The alternatives the Court discussed266
would have touched upon practically every aspect of college football and
beyond. It is simply wrong to call those restrictions “less” restrictive than
the television program at issue in NCAA.
The reason why it is frequently impossible to evaluate which of two
restraints is the more or less restrictive one is because they will frequently
operate in different markets. The alternative restraints suggested in NCAA
were likely less restrictive in television markets because they did not
operate in television markets at all. They would have operated in the
markets that constitute and feed football programs, from salaries for
coaches to amenities in training facilities and stadiums. They even would
have operated in markets for higher education generally by affecting the
way tuition revenue might be used. Because comparing between two
restraints almost always means measuring and comparing
“restrictiveness” in completely different markets, it not only replicates but
exacerbates the incommensurability problem presented by rule of reason
balancing.267
Even if the comparison of less restrictive alternatives could be
limited to a single market, the doctrine itself is no more determinative than
other comparative rules like the rule of reason balancing. To the extent
balancing is crude, comparison of alternatives will be similarly crude268
because there is no mathematical certainty added by restricting the inquiry
to alternatives.
The use of less restrictive alternatives introduces additional room for
error and does little to reduce the inherent indeterminacy of the rule of
reason. Consequently, there is good reason why a less restrictive
alternatives test has not previously appeared in the Supreme Court’s rule
of reason jurisprudence. But just as there is good reason why a less
restrictive alternatives test has never been included as a step in the
Supreme Court’s rule of reason inquiry, there is equally good reason why
so many have suggested the value of considering less restrictive
alternatives in antitrust analysis. Thus, I do not suggest that courts should
never consider alternatives when analyzing restraints; it would be
wrongheaded to deny them access to so useful a tool. My claim is that less
restrictive alternatives do not, and should not, operate as a formal step in
the rule of reason as the Ninth Circuit used them in O’Bannon and the
265. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984).
266. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 106–110.
267. See Easterbrook, supra note 179, at 13.
268. See Hemphill, supra note 6, at 961 (“Identifying a balanced LRA has many of the same
pitfalls that afflict net-effects balancing between the conduct and inaction.”).

630

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:587

Ninth Circuit used, and the Supreme Court permitted, in Alston.
Consideration of alternatives does have strong intuitive appeal, though,
and the existence (or absence) of alternative ways of doing something
conveys a great deal of information about the choice that a defendant has
made when it adopts a particular restraint. The question is what that
information is and how it should feature in antitrust analysis.
III. MAKING THE MOST OF LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES:
CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
Given the Court’s haphazard road to applying the less restrictive
alternatives test in Alston, it is not clear how a less restrictive alternatives
test would or does work. Professor Hemphill sees less restrictive
alternatives tests in a lot of places,269 and the short answer is they are in a
lot of places. As is clear from the discussion above, though, they are not
and should not be a formal part of the rule of reason inquiry. The question
remains, then, how are they used and how should they be used in antitrust
cases. The cases show that alternatives can be useful in a variety of ways,
but they are most significant to the inquiry undertaken by the ancillary
restraints doctrine, and their recent popularity suggests a renewed role for
the ancillary restraints doctrine.
A. Consideration of Alternatives in Antitrust Cases
Consideration of alternatives can be useful in a variety of ways. For
instance, in Broadcast Music, the Court relied on the defendants’ use of a
comparatively less restrictive alternative—a nonexclusive license as
opposed to an exclusive license—to negate the possibility of any harm
resulting from the restraint.270 In that case, consideration of an alternative
(arguably a more restrictive one) was not used to indicate the value of the
restraint or its legality but rather to deny the possibility that it would harm
competition, which is a matter of causation not specific to antitrust law.
Conversely, the existence of less restrictive alternatives can tell a
different kind of causation story. In Clayton Act Section 7271 horizontal
merger cases, which are less permissive than Section 1 rule of reason
cases, the burden is clearly on defendants to show that any efficiency
justifications for the merger are specific to the merger.272 The examination

269. See id. at 938-39 (describing attention to less restrictive alternatives in analyzing the rule of
reason, ancillary restraints, merger efficiencies, tying, and causation).
270. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
271. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
272. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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of less restrictive alternatives can be helpful to show that there are other
ways to achieve the same efficiencies without the merger.273
On this view, there is nothing particular about consideration of
alternatives to antitrust and no way it should operate differently in antitrust
than in other areas of the law. The problem arises when less restrictive
alternatives are included in steps specific to antitrust analysis in ways that
seek to alter the analysis. The difficulty that defendants face in establishing
less restrictive alternatives in Section 1 cases, for instance, might be
warranted by a different legal standard as applied to Section 7 cases
because of a skepticism, causally or doctrinally, of efficiency justifications
in merger cases.274 Indeed, much of the doctrinal difficulty introduced by
arguments for less restrictive alternatives is not the result of their
problems; it is the result of their usefulness. They can be used to
undermine virtually any justification, especially on the margin, and the
question is whether antitrust doctrine requires that. The answer to that
question will vary based on the type of review being applied. It is certainly
possible that less restrictive alternatives are more appropriate for some
forms of antitrust scrutiny, such as review of efficiency justifications in
mergers, than others, such as review of a vertical restraint under Sections
1 or 2.
Several commentators have argued that consideration of less
restrictive alternatives can be useful for demonstrating the intent of
antitrust defendants.275 That makes a lot of sense. After all, if a defendant
passes up one method of doing business that does not restrict competition
in favor of another that does, that decision can be an indication of their
intent to harm competition rather than to bring about the productive
activity. That idea is not limited to antitrust. For instance, in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, the Supreme Court used St. Paul’s decision to forgo one form
of speech restriction in favor of another one as an indication of its intent
to unconstitutionally limit free speech rights.276 Of course, such
alternatives need not be less restrictive. In R.A.V., the City’s rejection of a
broader ordinance was used to indicate its intent to limit the speech rights
of a subset of speakers, which was the constitutionally more problematic
of the two alternatives.277
Including determinations of intent, however, opens the aperture on
antitrust analysis beyond the rule of reason. The role of intent in rule of
273. Kauper, supra note 55, at 909.
274. See e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (1997).
275. See 7 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 26, ¶ 1505a; Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note
57, at 297; Feldman, supra note 22, at 563; Hemphill, supra note 6, at 963–68.
276. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
277. Id.
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reason cases is fairly limited: it is used as an indication of the likely effects
of a restraint.278 In a per se case, intent itself can be enough.279 If
consideration of alternatives is a useful tool in antitrust because of its
ability to establish intent, it is likely as (if not more) useful in per se cases
than in rule of reason ones.
In Fortner, for instance, the Court used the possibility that productive
gains could be had without use of a tie to reject the restraint
categorically.280 Similarly, although the Court settled on the rule of reason
in Actavis, it used the existence of alternatives to signal circumstances
under which settlements would almost certainly be illegal whether or not
they failed the rule of reason balancing.281
Indeed, in many of the Supreme Court cases in which consideration
of alternatives has played a part—NCAA, Maricopa County Medical
Society, Fortner, and Actavis—they have been used not in applying the
rule of reason but rather in deciding what category of analysis to apply:
per se or rule of reason. Answering that question is obviously not the
object of the rule of reason, which is applied only after that decision has
been made; rather, it is the object of a different aspect of antitrust analysis:
the ancillary restraints doctrine.
B. Alternatives and the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine: Categorizing
Cases and Restraints
Although advanced by scholars and some lower courts as part of the
rule of reason itself, the Court’s consideration of alternatives actually fits
more comfortably with the ancillary restraints inquiry than within
application of the rule of reason. The ancillary restraints doctrine and the
less restrictive alternatives test ask fundamentally the same question:
whether the restraint is necessary to the productive justification.282 The
availability of a less restrictive alternative indicates that the suspected
restraint is not truly necessary since there is some other restraint that would
serve the same productive end. Thus, when Addyston Pipe asked whether
a restraint was “reasonably necessary”283 to the underlying productive
transaction, it was not asking whether the transaction on the whole
278. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Hemphill, supra note
6, at 966.
279. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224, 224 n.59 (1940).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 171–176.
281. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013) (using the example of the alternative of
when the purpose of the reverse-payment settlement is “a desire to maintain and to share patentgenerated monopoly profits”).
282. See Robinson, supra note 174, at 232.
283. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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increased or reduced competition; it asked what contribution the restraint
made to the productive transaction.284
The several Supreme Court cases cited as examples of less restrictive
alternatives tests fit the causation story of ancillary restraints, not the
balancing of the rule of reason. In NCAA, when the Court concluded that
the alternative of no collective television plan would be as effective to the
NCAA’s purpose,285 it was denying any connection between the restraint
and the justification. That could be described as “balancing” only if the
categorical exclusion of a justification is equated to zero weight. While
mathematically true, that vision of balancing is not a particularly helpful
one. Professor Hemphill describes the circumstance when a restraint “fails
ancillarity” because “the action makes no incremental contribution to the
claimed justification.”286 That is exactly what the Court concluded in
NCAA with regard to the television plan, and that is a determination made
under the ancillary restraints doctrine, not rule of reason balancing.
Unlike the rule of reason, which portends to balancing, the ancillary
restraints doctrine is necessarily categorical in its determinations.
Although consideration of alternatives can be helpful for determining
whether a restraint truly is ancillary to a productive transaction, analyzing
less restrictive alternatives in the rule of reason threatens to confuse the
weighing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the rule of
reason (which itself has the potential to become all-inclusive) with the
causation analysis represented by the ancillary restraints doctrine.287
The danger comes not from considering alternatives but from the
comparative nature of searching for “less” restrictive alternatives.
Considering alternatives within the ancillary restraints doctrine can help
to pare down the number of restraints under consideration to simplify rule
of reason balancing, i.e., to exclude from balancing restraints that do not
actually contribute to productive activity. But the result of the ancillary
restraints analysis is binary: per se condemnation of restraints that do not
contribute to productive transactions (those that “fail ancillarity”) and rule
of reason balancing for those that do.288 The ancillary restraints doctrine
284. See supra text accompanying notes 71–77.
285. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114–15 (1984).
286. Hemphill, supra note 6, at 953; see also Muris, supra note 224, at 863.
287. Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of
Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade Analysis, in 15 RESEARCH
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 65–68 (Richard Zerbe, Jr. & Victor P. Goldberg eds., 1992); Jesse W.
Markham, Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 635 (2012) (distinguishing the ancillary restraints and balancing
questions).
288. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J.); Robert H. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. SECTION ANTITRUST L. 211,
212 (1959); see Arthur, Workable Rule of Reason, supra note 60, at 344 (“Taft’s analysis is relatively
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does not involve any kind of comparative analysis between the
restrictiveness of restraints that do in fact contribute to productive efforts,
which is what a less restrictive alternatives approach would do. Importing
a less restrictive alternatives test into the rule of reason threatens
performing the wrong analysis in the wrong step of the process.
In order to do any real work, the ancillary restraints doctrine has to
precede the rule of reason, an ordering that fits both the doctrine and the
commentary. In NCAA, the Court described the finding that the television
program did not contribute to the NCAA’s product as a “predicate” finding
to consideration of the NCAA’s efficiency justification.289 Most
understandings of the ancillary restraints doctrine reflect this threshold,
channeling function of ancillary restraints analysis,290 but uses are
confused. Professor Hovenkamp concludes the ancillary restraints
doctrine “was never applied in the NCAA case because the defendants
never made a convincing argument that the limitation . . . was reasonably
necessary to the functioning of the venture,”291 but that usage confuses
application of the ancillary restraints test with the restraint satisfying the
test. The ancillary restraints doctrine was applied in NCAA, as it was in
Addyston Pipe, but the defendants were not able to satisfy the test. The
challenged restraints “failed ancillarity,” so they were not subject to rule
of reason balancing. And if the ancillary restraints inquiry is going to do
any work, it must precede rule of reason balancing.
Connecting less restrictive alternatives test to rule of reason
balancing threatens to resurrect the previously performed, binary,
ancillarity analysis in the context of the incremental nature of balancing.
Once the court concludes that the restraint actually contributes to the
productive transaction, its consideration of alternatives should end lest
they cloud the very different comparison inherent in rule of reason
balancing.
Some see less restrictive alternatives as a way to avoid the
indeterminacy of balancing by setting the less restrictive alternatives as a
step prior to balancing.292 But the incremental and comprehensive nature
of less restrictive alternatives analysis invites even unintended balancing.
unambitious. It seeks only to make rough either/or judgments.”); id. at 381 (describing the “polar
models of cartel and firm”); see also Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 57, at 301–02 (rejecting the
notion that the ancillary restraints inquiry is one “of degree”).
289. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114.
290. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 140 (“The ancillary restraints doctrine is not a comprehensive
method for applying the rule of reason, but rather an early stage decision about which mode of analysis
should be applied.”).
291. Id.
292. 7 ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed.), supra note 26, ¶ 1507d (describing the final step in his rule of
reason approach, balancing, as a “last resort”); Hemphill, supra note 6, at 949 (describing the role of
less restrictive alternatives in resolving judicial “anxiety about balancing”).
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Alston, with its application of the less restrictive alternatives test, again,
provides the example. In Alston, the court held that, while the NCAA could
not impose these restraints, the individual conferences (which themselves
are collections of schools) could because the conferences doing so would
be less restrictive than the larger NCAA doing so.293 But there was no
difference in the justification offered between the conferences and the
NCAA; the procompetitive justification was the same, and the district
court had previously rejected that justification as not being served by those
restraints.294 The only difference between the two restraints was the reach
of the anticompetitive effect of having the limits at the national level
versus the conference level. The court effectively engaged in balancing
(seeing a reduced harm at the conference level and weighing it against a
procompetitive justification) in choosing the conference-level restraint
over the national one.295 In so doing, it ratified the conferences’ imposition
of a restraint for which it had previously found no procompetitive
justification, a nonsensical outcome.296 By asking courts to engage in
incremental analysis, the less restrictive alternatives approach encourages
courts not to eschew balancing but to make it paramount, even at the cost
of the ancillary restraints analysis, and in so doing to perpetuate under the
rubric of less restrictive alternatives the problems of balancing that
commentators and courts seek to avoid.
Having correctly situated consideration of alternatives in the
ancillary restraints doctrine and outside of the rule of reason itself, the
question remains about what role less restrictive alternatives should have
in ancillary restraints analysis, which is not coterminous with

293. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 958 F.3d 1239, 1258 (9th
Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
294. Id. at 1259–60.
295. The court apparently did not recognize that if the restraint lacked a procompetitive
justification at the national level, there was also no procompetitive justification at the conference level,
a far more fundamental problem than the possibility of a less restrictive alternative. The court’s failure
to see the fundamental deficiency in the alternative it considered is emblematic of the kinds of errors
invited by the incremental approach of less restrictive alternatives, in which the comparison of
restrictiveness is likely to mask the much more important question of whether the procompetitive
justification is actually served by either of the alternatives. For its part, the Supreme Court further
muddied the relationship by using the less restrictive alternative of conference-level restraints as
evidence of the “modesty” of the district court decree, Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2165, suggesting for the
first time that judicial modesty is a feature of the rule of reason.
296. It should be noted here that the relative market power of the NCAA and the various
conferences is hardly fixed. Even very recent shifts in conference alignment have changed the potential
for competition among the conferences to serve as a check on their market power. See Tom Goldman,
A Seismic Shakeup in College Sports as UCLA and USC Join Big Ten, NPR (July 1, 2022),
https://www.npr.org/2022/07/01/1109470751/a-seismic-shakeup-in-college-sports-as-ucla-and-uscjoin-big-ten [https://perma.cc/ECY4-LU4Q] (describing the concentration of college football into two
“superconferences”).
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consideration of alternatives. The answer to that question helps to
illuminate the meaning of the ancillary restraints doctrine.
IV. ALTERNATIVES AS A WINDOW TO THE ANCILLARY
RESTRAINTS DOCTRINE
Confronting how consideration of alternatives can and cannot work
in antitrust provides a window into the oft-misunderstood and
underappreciated ancillary restraints doctrine. Comparative approaches,
such as consideration of less restrictive alternatives, emphasize
quantitative forms of analysis because comparison requires some form of
quantification. The inability of less restrictive alternatives to answer the
ancillary restraints question, which is asked in terms of necessity rather
than balance, highlights the limits of not only less restrictive alternatives
but also other quantitative approaches to ancillary restraints analysis and
emphasizes the qualitative aspects and limitations of the ancillary
restraints doctrine.
A. Alternatives and Purpose
If consideration of alternatives is helpful for conducting ancillary
restraints analysis, the question is why. At its base, the ancillary restraints
doctrine reflects that the treatment of individual restraints under antitrust
law depends on whether they are related to some productive transaction.
The problem, though, is that there is no authoritative statement of the
nature of that relationship. According to Bork:
To be ancillary, and hence lawful, an agreement eliminating
competition must be subordinate and collateral to a separate,
legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and
collateral in the sense that it makes the main transaction more
effective in accomplishing legitimate purposes.297

Bork describes the nature of the relationship as making the
“transaction more effective in accomplishing legitimate purposes” but
does not say how much more effective the restraint has to make the main
transaction. Five percent more? Ten percent more? Must it make the
productive transaction less expensive, yield more product, or occur more
quickly? Although limiting the relationship to contribution to the
effectiveness of the restraint is helpful in that it excludes other
justifications, such as mere preference or ones paradoxical to antitrust like
the ones advanced by the defendants in Addyston Pipe,298 it specifies
297. BORK, supra note 59, at 27.
298. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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neither the quantum of contribution necessary nor even the units, such as
cost, yield, or time, one would measure.
Some approach the problem from purpose: to use the ancillary
restraints doctrine to evaluate the purpose of the challenged restraint to
contribute to a productive transaction or to reduce competition.299
Addyston Pipe repeatedly evaluates the restraint in terms of the purpose of
the contract,300 to the point of claiming that the “very statement of the rule
implies that the contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to
which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary.”301 Even using
purpose as the touchstone for evaluating the degree of restrictiveness the
law will tolerate “whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair
protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given.”302
“The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of protection
needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity
of such restraints may be judicially determined.”303 Focusing on purpose
opens up the door to two different, potentially related possibilities for
applying the ancillary restraints doctrine.
The first possibility is to equate “purpose” with “intent.” This is
where Professor Hemphill seems to be going with his third function of less
restrictive alternatives: “smoking out” bad intent.304 That might make
some sense, because although rule of reason analysis is ambivalent to
intent, per se analysis is not. Under the rule of reason, intent is used to
determine the likely effects of a restraint but can neither condemn nor save
it,305 while under the per se rule, a restraint intended to restrain competition
is a per se Section 1 violation.306 But if we take that premise seriously—if
the existence of less restrictive alternatives demonstrate the presence of
intent to restrain competition—then it raises some questions, like whether
the defendant can rebut a lack of ancillarity with evidence of good intent,
which is to say intent that it is trying to compete. “Purpose” seems to be
broader than merely the defendants’ intent. At least as to rule of reason
cases, for which good intent is no defense, “purpose” means the purpose
of the transaction not as intended by the parties but as demonstrated by

299. See Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 57, at 296–97.
300. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (“merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
contract”); id. at 283 (“[A]ncillary to the main and lawful purpose of the contract.”).
301. Id. at 282.
302. Id. (quoting Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Co., [1894] App. Cas. 535, 567).
303. Id.
304. See Hemphill, supra note 6, at 947; see also Arthur, Workable Rule of Reason, supra note
60, at 380–83 (distinguishing between objective and intent-based components in ancillary restraints
analysis and using less restrictive alternatives for the purpose of determining intent).
305. See Bd. of Trade of Chi v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 278–79.
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objective criteria such as theory or practice. Intent itself remains a
secondary consideration.
The second possibility is to reconsider the role that less restrictive
alternatives might have in determining whether the restraint is in
furtherance of some productive purpose. It is possible to use the existence
of a less restrictive alternative to conclude that a restraint was not in
furtherance of a productive purpose,307 but the existence of a less
restrictive alternative is neither necessary nor sufficient for doing so. In
NCAA, the Court cited the lack of any real connection between the restraint
and the productive purpose, not a less restrictive one. Indeed, the restraints
the Court pointed to as alternatives were more restrictive.308 Of course, just
because a defendant happens to pick a relatively restrictive restraint does
not mean that it is in furtherance of an anticompetitive purpose; it could
simply be an overly restrictive way of furthering a productive purpose.
Although a favorite argument of less restrictive alternatives analysis,
general appeals to “purpose” are not particularly helpful for analysis of
Section 1 cases, at least those that fall within the rule of reason. That is
because of the limited role that purpose plays in rule of reason cases and
the limited role that the consideration of alternatives can have in
determining the purpose of any particular restraint.
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives and “Reasonably
Necessary” Restraints
The consideration of alternatives in the ancillary restraints doctrine
presents substantial risk of promoting what at first appears to be a
determinate test (whether there are alternatives) over what is in reality an
admittedly indeterminate doctrine. Rather than explicitly asking whether
there are less restrictive alternatives, the ancillary restraints inquiry asks
whether the restraint is “reasonably necessary”309 to the productive
transaction. That hardly resolves the matter, as either term is open to
considerable interpretation. Professor Hovenkamp invokes Learned
Hand’s Carroll Towing formulation of optimal precautions,310 but that is
just another way of asking whether the restraint is worth the productive
gains311 and thereby invokes the same type of balancing as rule of reason
analysis generally. “Necessary” is not much better. It is possible to get to
307. Arthur, Workable Rule of Reason, supra note 60, at 381; Eldridge, supra note 71, at 10.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 109–10.
309. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (1898).
310. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.01 (citing United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
311. Under Carroll Towing, it would be the gain as discounted by the likelihood of them being
realized. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
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insistence on less, or least, restrictive alternatives from “necessary.”312 But
as demonstrated in the famous constitutional case M’Culloch v. Maryland,
“necessary” can mean varying degrees of necessity. The discretion the
Court afforded Congress in that case313 was far broader than any kind of
less restrictive alternatives test.
Of course, as Professor Hovenkamp points out, “a restraint can be
‘reasonably necessary’ even though some less restrictive alternative
exists.”314 Justice Rehnquist explicitly connected Addyston Pipe’s use of
“necessary” with a reasonableness standard in arguing against a less
restrictive alternatives test.315 It is not clear that there is any necessary
relationship between less restrictive alternatives and determining whether
a restraint is “reasonably necessary” to a particular productive transaction.
Rather, as Professor Hovenkamp continues, the “‘reasonably
necessary’ formula thus highlights the need for a discriminating judgment
about the allegedly less restrictive alternative.”316 He believes that
“discriminating judgment” can be applied quantitatively by measuring
“how much worse for the parties or how much better for society?”317 But
if the problems of the rule of reason demonstrate anything, it should be the
perils of an overly quantitative approach to applying the doctrine. As
Professor Hovenkamp points out elsewhere in the same treatise, the test
should be driven by the purpose of the inquiry.318 When one considers the
purpose of the ancillary restraints inquiry, it becomes clear that
quantitative comparisons, like rigorous less restrictive alternatives
requirements, raise the same problems in ancillarity analysis that they raise
in rule of reason balancing. Fortunately, because the ancillary restraints
doctrine does not call for balancing, quantification is not necessary, and
those problems are avoidable.

312. See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 55, at 909 n.73 (“This description may mean only that the
restraint must bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate purpose of the integration. But
‘necessity’ may also be read to encompass an examination of less restrictive alternatives.”); Richard
S. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (1981) (“[T]he
criteria for ‘reasonable necessity’ and ‘least restrictive alternative’ must be the same.”).
313. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“All means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.”).
314. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.03(b).
315. Nat’l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1079–80 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
316. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.03; see also FTC & U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 9 (2000).
317. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 109, § 15.03(b).
318. Id. § 15.01 (“Like all such general standards, reasonableness varies not only with the
circumstances but also with the purpose of the inquiry.”).
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C. The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine as Narrative
Whether stated in terms of “purpose,” “intent,” or “necessity,” the
ancillary restraints doctrine is not so much a test as it is a narrative device.
It is about the defendant telling and the court believing a story: that there
is a connection between the challenged restraint and a legitimate business
activity. The ancillary restraints doctrine is about causation and, to the
extent it evaluates intent, credibility.
In that sense, as mentioned above, it is a binary determination.319 It
is meaningless to describe restraints as “80% ancillary” or “mostly
ancillary.” Restraints are ancillary or they are not. It is also a determination
specific to antitrust law: some forms of ancillarity are permitted and some
are prohibited. Thus, the ancillary restraints inquiry should be undertaken
with antitrust law in mind.
For instance, the doctrine might operate differently in vertical and
horizontal cases. Horizontal restraints generally present a greater risk to
competition than vertical ones.320 Consequently, the ancillary restraints
doctrine should be sensitive to that risk in the nature of the ancillarity it
insists upon. For the pipe companies in Addyston Pipe, for whom any
agreement is suspicious, we might require a much stronger showing of the
connection between the restraint and productive activity than we would
require of a vertical distribution agreement for a company with relatively
low market share, as in Sylvania.321 In neither case, though, would the
existence or absence of less restrictive alternatives tell us much about
whether the challenged restraints were “sufficiently” ancillary to the
productive transaction. We would need a more general theory about how
antitrust should operate with regard to that particular transaction in order
to make that determination.
1. The False Determinacy of Less Restrictive Alternatives
in Ancillary Restraints Analysis
Like rule of reason balancing, a quantitative approach to ancillary
restraints offers an attractive certainty from quantitative comparison, but
as in the rule of reason itself, it is a false certainty and for the same reason:
comparisons between restraints run into problems of both measurability
and incommensurability. As stated canonically by Horner v. Graves, a
rigorous account of necessity would ask whether “the restraint is such only
319. See supra text accompanying notes 286–88.
320. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 159–60.
321. The same holds true for mergers, which are challenged under a different standard than
Section 1 cases. Insisting on a closer fit between the restraint (the merger itself) and efficiency gains
might be sensible as a matter of antitrust law, see supra text accompanying note 272, quite apart from
the presence or absence of less restrictive alternatives.
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as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of whom
it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the
public.”322 The problem with that statement is that, even putting aside how
to quantify “fair,” the “protection to the interests of the party” cannot be
compared in any meaningful way with harm to “the interests of the
public.” It might be that there is no other way to answer that question, and
that is why the Court has eventually wound up with rule of reason
balancing as a last resort, but there is no reason to bring a similarly
indeterminate quantitative inquiry into earlier stages of the case, such as
in determining whether a restraint is ancillary to a particular productive
transaction.
2. The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine as a Sorting Device
Rather than determining whether the challenged restraint is in fact
justified by its contribution to the productive transaction, which is the
question asked by rule of reason balancing, the ancillary restraints doctrine
seeks only to describe whether and how the restraint contributes to
productive activity. Defendants cannot simply assert the connection, they
have to explain it. Although not determinative to the case, that explanation
provides a lot of value to antitrust scrutiny.
First, of course, it necessarily disqualifies restraints adopted in order
to further anticompetitive ends, such as the restraint in Addyston Pipe. That
might not seem like much of a contribution, but there is considerable
incentive for cartel members to adopt exactly such restraints since those
will be the most profitable to cartel members. The requirement that they
have to explain themselves has a substantial deterrent effect.
Second, even for restraints that are not superficially naked, the
ancillary restraints doctrine can clarify the analysis.323 Take Polk Bros. v.
Forest City Enterprises, a leading modern ancillary restraints case.324 Polk
Bros. involved a covenant not to compete in certain lines of business in a
lease, which eventually became a sale, of a shared building between an
appliance and home furnishing store (Polk Brothers, the lessor/seller) and
a home improvement store (Forest City, the lessee/buyer).325 As part of the
lease, Forest City had promised not to sell “major appliances and
furniture”326 in deference to Polk Brothers. Such a restraint is a horizontal
market allocation, which is generally per se unlawful.327
322. Horner v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73 (discussing how ancillary restraints doctrine
analysis cabins rule of reason balancing to specific restraints).
324. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (1985).
325. Id. at 187.
326. Id.
327. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
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The district court struck the restraint, but the Seventh Circuit held
that the covenant to not compete had to be considered not just in light of
the lease but in light of its effect on the lease.328 It was not just the existence
of the connection but the nature of the connection that mattered.329 Even
as a part of the larger lease, the arrangement would be illegal if for the sole
purpose of reducing the price Forest City paid for the lease. A cash
payment, or reduction in rent, is not a “productive transaction” for the
purposes of the ancillary restraints doctrine, otherwise every horizontal
restraint could be purchased. But this covenant had a different purpose. As
the court explained, if appliances were offered at both Polk Brothers and
Forest City, Forest City could free ride off of Polk Brothers’ advertising
of appliances at that particular store.330 One can accept or reject that
explanation,331 but the need for it is prompted by the ancillary restraints
doctrine, which requires the defendant to describe the relationship between
the restraint and the productive transaction, not merely quantify the impact
of both the restraint and the activity.
The danger of including comparative methods, and especially less
restrictive alternatives, in ancillary restraints analysis is in inviting their
inherent incrementalism into what is binary determination. Less restrictive
alternatives present two distinct opportunities for confusion: First, as
demonstrated by Alston and discussed above, allowing plaintiffs to offer
less restrictive alternatives essentially gives plaintiffs a second,
incremental, and therefore comparatively easy, bite at the ancillary
restraints apple.332 Second, the less restrictive alternatives analysis, by
emphasizing the marginal differences between two restraints, emphasizes
the point of highest indeterminacy. At the margin is the point where data
about the restraint’s overall effects is cloudiest, but the margin is exactly
the point that less restrictive alternatives analysis emphasizes. Doing so
increases the risk that a court will extrapolate from a failure at the margin
328. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 190.
329. Cf. Gregory J. Werden, The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine After Dagher, 8 SEDONA CONF.
J. 17, 22 (2007) (insisting that, for a joint venture, there should be an “organic connection” between
the restraint and the conduct of the venture).
330. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 190.
331. Antitrust is generally sympathetic to the free riding argument, at least in vertical cases. See
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–92 (2007).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 233–38. The NCAA actually presented this argument
at the Supreme Court in Alston, but the Court misread the argument as being one about whether the
district court was insisting on the “least” restrictive alternative. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141,
2161 (2021). While it is true that an incrementalistic approach to individual restraints would lead to a
least restrictive alternative standard, it is not the only consequence of doing so; the problem of
incrementally smaller ancillary restraints analysis also goes to whether the court sees the connection
to the defendant’s procompetitive justification at all, since no single aspect of any particular restraint
is likely to be necessary to the defendant’s justification. The Supreme Court did not mention the
ancillary restraints doctrine in Alston at all.
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to a complete failure of the restraint. It might be worth the added risk if
the less restrictive alternatives test added much to the ancillary restraint
inquiry, but it does not. That is not to argue that less restrictive alternatives
have no place in ancillary restraints analysis, just that the less restrictive
alternatives test should not subsume the larger ancillary restraint inquiry
by becoming the sole, or dominant, test for whether a restraint is
“necessary” to a particular productive transaction.
O’Bannon demonstrates the problem of using quantitative
comparisons like less restrictive alternatives in ancillary restraints
analysis. The court drew the compensation line at “full cost of attendance,”
specifically rejecting cash payments as a less restrictive alternative
because it was at full cost of attendance that the line between producing
amateur and non-amateur sports was crossed.333 That determination was
categorical, not quantitative.334 But “full cost of attendance” is itself a
constructed figure. Suppose the O’Bannon plaintiffs could produce
evidence to show that consumers do not distinguish between players who
receive the full cost of attendance and those who are provided on-campus
summer jobs paying above-market rates?335 That actually appears to have
happened for payment of up to $10,000 according to surveys conducted as
part of Alston.336 If so, then the consideration of less restrictive alternatives
would immediately become quantitative again (How much higher than
market rates? How much above $10,000?), opening the door to the selfsame incrementalism the Ninth Circuit avoided by rejecting the $5,000
cash payment. The existence of less restrictive alternatives can inform the
ancillary restraints analysis, but if it subsumes it, the problem of
incrementalism is likely to become unavoidable.
Judge Taft’s formulation of ancillary restraints as those “reasonably
necessary” to productive activity could hardly be more resistant to
quantitative, superficially formulaic approaches like the existence of less
restrictive alternatives. Rather, the ancillary restraints doctrine reflects a
value judgment about the relationship between restraints and productive
activity, and like most value judgments, it does not lend itself to a formula.
Bork—dean of Chicago School economic reductivism in antitrust—
acknowledged Judge Taft’s distinction between naked and ancillary
restraints as “juridical rather than economic.”337 Judge Taft rejected such

333. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2015).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 204–09.
335. See NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 2019–20, § 12.4.1(b) (requiring student
employment to be at “a rate commensurate with the going rate in that locality for similar services”).
336. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 958 F.3d 1239, 1258 (9th
Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
337. BORK, supra note 59, at 27.
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comparisons—his “sea of doubt”338—for selecting among naked
restrictions on competition.339 We should be hesitant to appeal to
quantitative comparisons in deciding between what is in fact naked and
what is ancillary.
More than it asks whether the restraints contribute to productive
activity, the ancillary restraints doctrine asks how. The defendants in
Addyston Pipe could demonstrate a connection between their restraint and
their productive activity. The restraint reduced price uncertainty and
volatility, assuring a continued supply of pipe to the public at “fair”
prices.340 It may very well have done so as a matter of fact. But the
Sherman Act outlaws exactly those justifications.341 The ancillary
restraints doctrine’s channeling function implements the Sherman Act’s
policy choice to favor some forms of restrictions, like those avoiding free
riding, over others, like those providing market or price stability.
Requiring defendants to explain how the challenged restraint contributes
to productive behavior is critical to implementing that policy choice. Still,
the “how” question cannot be answered through purportedly quantitative
comparative techniques such as evaluating less restrictive alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Although favored by some commentators and inconsistently applied
by some lower courts, and despite its mention as dicta in American Express
and its unthinking acceptance in Alston, the less restrictive alternatives test
is problematic on its own terms and, more importantly, simply does not fit
in rule of reason balancing. It is understandable that some have latched
onto consideration of alternatives as a way to derive meaning in antitrust
cases—it can be a valuable and intuitive tool for thinking about restraints.
But its value is generic, not specific to antitrust, and it is completely
unconnected to rule of reason balancing.
Instead, the consideration of alternatives better fits within the
ancillary restraints doctrine and helps to highlight why it is important to
keep the ancillary restraints and balancing steps distinct in antitrust
analysis.342 That is not to say that less restrictive alternatives can simply
be applied in the ancillary restraints doctrine instead of in rule of reason
balancing. Even within the ancillary restraints doctrine, the stringent
338. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d,
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
339. Arthur, Workable Rule of Reason, supra note 60, at 343 n.28, 345.
340. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 279.
341. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220–21 (1940).
342. The analysis in this Article has focused on Section 1 cases, but the same arguments could
be made with regard to legitimacy of business justifications offered in Section 2 cases. See Devlin,
supra note 23, at 825; Hemphill, supra note 6, at 939 & n.56.
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requirements of the less restrictive alternatives inquiry are far too
restrictive for a doctrine as flexible as the ancillary restraints doctrine
needs to be in order to allow any degree of business discretion.
The introduction of less restrictive alternatives analysis into the rule
of reason reflects the need for more robust application of the ancillary
restraints doctrine, a doctrine that does not feature as prominently in
modern antitrust law as balancing. As the Court moves toward an
expansive application of the rule of reason, the ancillary restraints doctrine
has taken on less importance as a way to channel restraints between per se
and rule of reason analysis. Although not litigated as frequently, the
ancillary restraints doctrine serves an important channeling function, and
reinvigoration of ancillary restraints analysis might be one way to get
courts to halt the decline of the per se rule in antitrust by providing a
meaningful way to separate per se and rule of reason cases.
But to ask for greater emphasis on the ancillary restraints doctrine
does not mean that easy answers can be calculated in hard antitrust cases,
a mistake suggested by the kinds of comparative inquiries represented by
the less restrictive alternatives test. In the end, the ancillary restraints
standard of “reasonably necessary” calls for at least two value judgments:
one about how business owners should choose restraints to further
productive activity, and one about how antitrust enforcers should be
policing those choices. Antitrust cannot avoid those value judgments
through falsely mechanical forms of analysis such as less restrictive
alternatives, and attempts by commentators and lower courts to do so
within the rule of reason have only confused matters.343 Perhaps one
reason why the ancillary restraints doctrine has received comparatively
little attention is because its “reasonably necessary” standard is
inadequately concrete for judges who wish to avoid accepting, or
accepting responsibility for, the delegation arguably contained in the
language of the Sherman Act.344 Commentators are likely to offer up any
number of tools, rules, and tests that allow judges to claim they are
practicing objective analysis imbued with quantitative certainty rather than
making the hard judgments required by antitrust law. Judges should
decline those proposals.
343. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57 (2013);
Allensworth, supra note 257, at 55.
344. On the anxiety of judges and their turn to more deterministic methods in antitrust, see TIM
WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 90–91 (2018). On the delegation
of antitrust lawmaking to federal judges, see Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
732 (1988) (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.
It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned
to the term in 1890.”). See generally Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013 (2017).

